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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION 
Agriculture is the dominant sector in Sub-Saharan African economies and is a 
potential catalyst for generating broad-based, sustainable economic growth. Improving the 
performance of the agricultural sector requires increasing productivity through the adoption 
of high-yielding technologies, improved management of natural resources, and more efficient 
marketing systems and agribusinesses. The efficient production, processing and marketing 
of agricultural commodities is often linked to access to efficient and reliable financial 
services. As farm and nonfarm businesses grow and become more sophisticated, they often 
need sophisticated financial services offered by formal financial institutions. Governments 
and donors have devoted a significant amount of resources in Sub-Saharan Africa to the task 
of providing loans and other financial services to agribusinesses. These efforts may have 
helped specific enterprises, but most countries today still do not have a strong, viable 
financial sector that can provide reliable financial services to farms and other agnbusinesses. 
This paper aims to improve our understanding of why this situation exists and 
identifies areas for additional research. It is based on an extensive literature review of 
financial markets and agribusiness development in the region, and by focused field work in 
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Niger, and The Gambia. It was prepared for the Africa Bureau 
of AI.D. as part of its effort to guide country missons in the design of successful 
agribusiness programs and projects. 
FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 
For the purposes of this paper, the financial sector was divided into three financial 
systems- formal. semi-formal. and informal- to emphasize the wide variety of financial 
arrangements found in Sub-Saharan African countries. The formal financial system in most 
countries has three components. One component includes the Ministries of Finance, the 
Central Banks, and the other national regulatory and prudential institutions. Normally, 
these entities do not make loans or accept deposits from clients other than the formal 
financial institutions. The second component consists of financial institutions that provide 
financial services directly to savers and borrowers, and these are the focus of this review. 
Commercial banks, savings banks, postal savings, development banks, cooperative banks, and 
unit rural banks are the most important formal financial institutions found in most countries. 
The third component represents the capital markets, including money, bond, and stock 
markets. Capital markets are in the early stages of development in most Sub-Saharan 
African countries. To date they have not been very important for agribusiness finance so 
they were excluded from this analysis. 
Semi-formal financial arrangements generally fall outside the purview of the formal 
banking authorities. They usually involve groups of persons in some type of membership 
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organization and are often owned by their members. Some receive government and donor 
funds to subsidize their operations and for use in on-lending. The semi-formal financial 
arrangements most important for agribusinesses are agricultural cooperatives, credit unions, 
integrated development projects and parastatal organizations, village banks, self-help groups, 
and savings clubs. The least formal of these arrangements, especially village banks and self-
help groups, are the fastest growing and are popular among NGOs and PVOs. 
The informal financial system includes a heterogeneous set of individual and group 
financial arrangements. Some are autonomous and can be expected to thrive even when the 
formal system develops and expands, while others may represent a reaction to the repression 
of the formal system and may decline in importance as the formal system develops. Some 
experimentation is underway to use informal finance to channel funds to farmers and small 
scale enterprises. Examples of informal systems important to agnbusinesses are communal 
clubs and mutual aid associations, rotating savings and credit associations, moneylenders, 
moneykeepers, private input suppliers, and friends, relatives and family. 
APPROACHES TO FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
Three general observations should be made about the literature reviewed before 
discussing individual approaches to the development of financial systems. fl!]1, much of the 
literature is case study oriented with few cross-country studies or syntheses that systematic-
ally review the experiences of several countries. Therefore, it is necessary to view with 
caution the recommendations often found in studies which suggest that countries should 
introduce some reform or adopt some innovation because it appears to have worked in a 
small application in one country. Furthermore, the lack of systematic comparative analyses 
and thorough review of lessons learned is one reason that similar problems emerge across 
countries. 
Second, the literature clearly shows that most governments and donors have pursued 
a supply-leading approach to finance which emphasized increasing the supply and reducing 
the cost of loans to specific sectors (i.e., agriculture, small farmers, etc.). Institutional 
strengthening has also been pursued to support this strategy. The supply-leading approach 
has been shown to have several fundamental weaknesses. It ignored savings mobilization 
and created a dependency syndrome in which the lenders become dependent on cheap 
government and donor funds. It created rent seeking opportunities in which nontargeted 
borrowers used political influence to gain access to the cheap funds. Financial institutions 
were undermined because they were often not allowed sufficient margins to cover their costs 
and risks. Finally, credit was treated as an input in production so it's value as a fungible 
resource was ignored. The reforms that have been undertaken in many Sub-Saharan African 
countries in the past few years have reduced or eliminated many of these problems. 
The .tblrQ observation is that, until recently, most governments and donors have shied 
away from using the private sector to provide financial services to the agribusiness sector. 
At best, cooperatives are created and/ or are used to channel loans to farmers and 
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agribusinesses. But few programs, for example, try to stimulate traders or trading networks 
to lend to priority clientele groups. This results in a heavy bias towards state involvement 
with its several problems of accountability and viability. 
Several different forms of financial institutions have been promoted in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. For example, many countries have tried to expand commercial bank services to rural 
areas and reduce their urban bias. Targets and quotas have been established that specify 
the proportion of their loan portfolio that should be directed to rural loans. But in spite of 
these efforts, it has been difficult to get banks to make loans to borrowers and sectors that 
they perceive to be risky and uncreditworthy. 
Most countries have Post Office Savings Banks and/or some other types of savings 
bank. They are often the only formal financial institution to supply deposit services in rural 
areas. Two problems have prevented them from playing a larger role in financial 
development. The first is that many pay low interest rates and offer poor services. The 
second is that their resources are often simply deposited with the Treasury rather than used 
for lending to their savers. 
Development finance institutions (DFis) have been set up to support agricultural 
development in many countries. Many have performed poorly because they were expected 
to perform both wholesale lending to parastatals and retail lending to farmers and 
cooperatives. They have also been used by donors as credit outlets for integrated 
development projects. Therefore, many DFis do not mobilize savings and are dependent 
on government and donor funds. Since many have a large amount of nonperforming assets, 
they have been closed or recapitalized, and donors are rethinking their role in development. 
Ghana is the only Sub-Saharan African country to develop a wide network of unit 
rural banks in an effort to provide financial services to households and businesses in rural 
towns and villages. In theory they have an advantage over branches of commercial and 
development banks in knowing their local clientele and can, therefore, screen local loan 
applicants and investment projects better. In practice, they have not performed very well. 
Cooperative systems have been developed in many countries, especially to support 
agriculture. Donors have often used them to channel funds to specific clientele groups. 
Many of the cooperatives have become insolvent, however, and many have fallen victim to 
fraud and corruption when they have attempted to offer savings and credit services. They 
have experienced better loan recovery when they are able to deduct loan payments from the 
commodities delivered by members. 
Credit unions have received a large amount of government, donor, NGO and PVO 
support. The credit unions have performed best when they focused on savings mobilization. 
When they have been encouraged to expand lending to productive business ventures, they 
have run into loan recovery problems. Credit unions are unique compared to other financial 
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systems because of their emphasis on savings mobilization and they generally do not target 
their lending for specific lending purposes. 
Many bilateral aid programs, NGOs and PVOs actively promote the formation of 
local groups to engage in self-help activities and to pool savings. The funds mobilized are 
often deposited in a nearby financial institutions for use in making loans to individual 
members. Other groups are designed to create local village banks which mobilize savings 
and make loans. Since many of these groups are new and receive a great deal of assistance, 
the conditions required for their long term viability are not yet known. 
There are relatively few programs reported in the literature in which governments 
or donors specifically channel funds to private input suppliers and storeowners/merchants 
for on-lending to their clients. Since input suppliers and product traders are expected to 
emerge through the privatization and hberalization programs underway in many countries, 
this type of financial arrangement is worthy of additional study. 
Loan guarantee programs have been introduced in many countries to encourage 
greater lending and is a technique used by Women's World Banking in its operations. The 
literature is quite skeptical, however, about the extent to which these programs have actually 
contributed to additionality in loan programs. 
Finally, there are regional programs that attempt to strengthen financial programs. 
The African Agricultural Credit Association (AFRACA) is one such attempt. It's 
membership includes agricultural credit institutions and Central Banks in the region. They 
are beginning to experiment with MicroBanker, a software program developed by FAO for 
use on microcomputers to manage small deposit and loan accounts. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
The literature review and the focussed field visits resulted in the identification of 14 
key lessons learned concerning these attempts to develop financial markets in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. 
1. MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POLICIES. Financial markets 
cannot thrive unless the general macroeconomic and jinandal policies of the 
country are reasonably conducive. In recent years, the environment has been very 
negative for jinandal market development in many countries. 
Financial institutions are affected in several ways when macroeconomic policies and 
market trends are disadvantageous to agribusinesses. First, low profit enterprises appear 
too risky for lenders to finance; therefore they make few agricultural loans so their per unit 
operating costs are high. Second, they have few incentives to improve their capacity to 
service agribusinesses effectively, if they continue to concentrate on lending to urban 
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customers engaged primarily in import oriented commerce and trade. Third, they are 
discouraged from developing financial innovations to reduce costs and improve services for 
agribusiness customers. Fourth, the volume of voluntary deposits is low. F~ loan 
recovery levels are low. 
The current trend towards greater market h'beralization, deregulation and privatiza-
tion in Africa is encouraging and should provide more propitious conditions for developing 
the financial system and the economy as a whole. Some frustration has been expressed, 
however, over the slow economic response that has followed reforms. A difficulty of the 
heavily indebted nations is that foreign debt service coupled with fiscal imbalances lead to 
high interest rates for government securities; therefore, it is financially rational for financial 
institutions to invest in high yielding public debt rather than make loans for private sector 
expansion. 
2. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVI1Y, RISKS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE. 
Problems of low agricultural productivity, high production risks, and poor or 
nonexistent infrastructure reduce the potential for agribusiness development and 
retard the development of financial markets to serve agribusinesses. 
There are three important agricultural issues that have a negative impact on 
agricultural producers, on the agribusinesses that supply their inputs and market their 
outputs, and on the financial markets that provide them with financial services. The first 
is that productivity levels are low for many types of crops and livestock, so producers are 
bad credit risks because many are poor and have few reserves to cover debt obligations 
when profits and income are especially low. Second, agroclimatic conditions are difficult, 
especially in the Sahelian countries. Producers are subject to considerable production risks 
and periodic crop failures wipe out their savings and accumulated capital. Third, 
infrastructure is weak and this affects input and output markets. Some of these problems 
can be ameliorated with improved access to financial services, but for most finance is not 
the solution. 
A dynamic financial and agribusiness sector is needed to stimulate on-farm 
production, but its development is dependent on farm demand to grow. The structural 
problems of the agricultural sector are likely to take considerable time and investment to 
resolve. In the short term, economic reforms that require reductions in budget deficits may 
imply a cutback in government investments for agriculture. Therefore, another factor 
explaining the limited supply response of agriculture to recent reforms is that investments 
in irrigation, research and extension have been scaled down to reduce fiscal imbalances. 
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3. LOAN TARGETING AND SUBSIDIES. The subsidization and targeting of 
credit that has characterized many credit programs has failed to resolve the real 
problems faced by the target groups. But they have had a negative impact on the 
institutional viability of financial institutions and may have even reduced, rather 
than increase, financial services to small, low-income producers. 
Many credit programs have been designed to fund special groups believed to have 
poor access to financial services. Credit packages are often narrowly specified to fund a 
particular crop or production package, or for use in acquiring inputs or draft animals and 
equipment. Loans that qualify carry low interest rates. There are at least five problems 
with this approach. First, because of the fu.nglbility of finance, borrowers will shift loan 
funds to other purposes if they can earn a higher rate of return. Second, if the lender 
attempts to prevent the diversion of funds through close supervision, lender transaction costs 
are driven up, making it difficult to achieve long term self-sufficiency for the program. 
Third, the margins authorized for many targeted programs are often too low to cover lender 
costs and inflation, so the lender is decapitalized even if all loans are recovered. Fourth, 
if a project and/ or institution is started with subsidies, it is difficult to transform it into a 
viable self-sustaining institution. Finally, the amount of subsidies is always limited, so a 
subsidized program always faces a limit to the number of participants it can accommodate 
and there are few incentives for the participants to graduate from a subsidized program. 
The result of targeted, subsidized programs is often contra.:ry to what has been 
expected. The viability of financial institutions is undermined. Borrowers who receive 
subsidized loans are not necessarily better off if the loan simply represents a one-shot 
increase in liquidity rather than a regular access to finance. Because of the excess demand 
for funds, lenders must engage in credit rationing which permits those with influence and 
political connections to crowd out the small, low-income firms and households for which the 
funds are targeted. 
4. INTEREST RATES AND TRANSACTION COSTS. When Central Banks and 
governments attempt to set interest rates at below-market rates, the low interest 
rates charged for loans contribute to high transaction costs for borrowers and 
poor loan recovery, while reducing the viability of financial institutions. 
Transaction costs are high for lenders in spite of so-called "cheap" government and 
donor funds, and they tend to be higher than the spreads lenders are permitted to charge 
for loans. Since this often leads to excess demand for subsidized funds, the lenders have to 
employ non-price rationing when faced with interest rate controls. When borrowers face 
high borrowing costs they often maintain good relations with informal lending sources where 
transaction costs are lower. They are likely to repay the informal lenders first to maintain 
their credit reputation, but allow formal loans to fall into arrears if they conclude that the 
institution is transient and will not be able to provide a new loan after the current one is 
repaid. Formal financial institutions, therefore, find it difficult to achieve viability, because 
of narrow interest margins and poor loan recovery for targeted loans. 
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5. REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS. The 
regulatory and supervisory bodies for formal financial institutions have not 
developed sufficient capacity in many Sub-Saharan African countries to 
adequately ensure the pnu:Iential regulation of formal institutions, but they are 
now being called upon to expand their concerns into semi-formal financial 
systems. More attention is needed to designing institutions that encourage honest 
behavior and to monitoring and control procedures to support it. 
Policymakers have often attempted to build the financial system from the top down, 
and to use finance to stimulate economic growth. Rules and regulations have been 
established to direct lending to priority borrowers and sectors. Ministries of Finance and 
Central Banks have been preoccupied with monitoring how financial institutions have 
followed these regulations and ignored their traditional function of prudential regulation. 
Investments required to build strong regulatory and supervisory authorities have not been 
made so most Central Banks are poorly staffed and trained, have little research capability, 
and are not equipped to conduct regular, in-depth audits of the banking system. 
6. ACCESS TO FINANCIAL SERVICES, FINANCIAL DUALISM AND 
FINANCIAL LINKAGES. Financial dualism exists to a greater degree in Sub-
Saharan Africa than in other regions, and a larger proportion of firms and 
households rely entirely on the informal financial system for all their financial 
services. 
The fragmentary data that exist in Sub-Saharan Africa suggest that no more than 
about 10 percent of rural households and enterprises receive formal loans in any one year. 
A greater percentage of large, urban based firms are expected to have access to formal 
finance, especially for export crops, than do small, rural farms. In most countries, a 
somewhat larger percentage of households and enterprises, especially in urban areas, have 
a deposit or savings account with some type of bank, cooperative or credit union. At the 
same time, a much higher percentage report transactions with the informal sector. The data 
also reflect poor linkages between financial markets, agribusinesses and small and medium 
enterprises, especially in rural areas. The degree of financial linkages is important to 
understand for two reasons. First, where formal-informal financial linkages are numerous 
and important, it can be expected that macroeconomic polices, such as controls of the 
money supply in the formal sector, will also be transmitted to and influence the performance 
of informal finance. Second, where the linkages are well established, it may be possible to 
make formal loans to large creditworthy enterprises with the expectation that they will on-
lend to smaller enterprises with most difficult access, including agribusinesses in rural areas. 
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7. THE CRUCIAL ROLES OF SAVINGS MOBJUZATION AND LOAN 
RECOVERY. Savings mobilization and effective loan recovery are two key 
factors that influence the long term viability of jinoncial institutions. Both affect 
jinancial institutions and their clients in positive ways. 
Savings mobilization is a crucial factor in developing sound financial markets for two 
sets of reasons. First, the number of persons with deposit and savings accounts in a financial 
institution is generally much larger than the number with loans so many savers obtain great 
benefit from having secure places to hold their deposits and savings. Second, there are 
several ways that financial institutions benefit from mobilizing deposits. The total cost of 
funds may be cheaper, lenders can develop their own lending programs adapted to local 
needs, and information obtained from servicing a client's deposit and savings accounts can 
be useful in evaluating creditworthiness for loans. Default rates of 20 to 30 percent are 
common in many programs and are too high to be covered by raising interest rates to all 
borrowers. Default eventually destroys or severely retards financial institutions. 
8. COLLATERAL, CONTRACTENFORCEMENT,ANDPROPERTYRJGJn'S. 
The absence of well-defined property rights and unreliable legal systems are often 
viewed as constraints to the functioning of formal credit markets. But since land 
may have little value due to local customs, improvements in land titling may have 
little impact on access to formal loans. The informal jinancia1 system, however, 
has found ways to deal with these problems. 
There is some evidence that security of title increases access to financial markets, but 
this fact does not necessarily justify great emphasis on improving land property rights and 
the legal system. Two other properties of acceptable collateral are necessary. First, items 
pledged as loan collateral must have value, which implies that a valuation method exists. 
Second, the eventual transfer of ownership or control over the asset pledged as collateral 
must be enforceable, which implies that a socially accepted mechanism of contract 
enforcement exists. In the absence of effective enforcement through the legal system, 
informal loan contracts use explicit or implicit enforceability clauses, such as the continuance 
of business relationships in linked transactions, third-party guarantees, or the witnessing of 
contracts by local authorities. Ukewise, financial transactions with internal or built-in 
enforcement mechanisms, including supplier credit and other linked transactions, have 
attained a viability and stability that formal financial transactions rarely achieve. More 
attention is needed to identify how traditional contract enforcement mechanisms can be 
applied to formal finance. 
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9. THE IMPliCATIONS OF INFORMAL FINANCE. Informaljinancialsystems 
are pervasive in Sub-Saharan Africa, but there is no clear view about what this 
implies for formal financial systems or what policymakers should do, if anything, 
about informal finance. 
Most Sub-Saharan Africa countries have tried to reduce the role of informal finance 
by actively encouraging the semi-formal and formal financial systems. In some ~ they 
have tried to regulate them, such as when they try to impose interest rate restrictions. Two 
specific options have been largely untested until recent years. The first is to design specific 
informal-formallinkages, such as depositing self-help group funds as a loan guarantee with 
banks or developing wholesale-retail credit operations with traders, processors and other 
large enterprises that agree to make informal loans to small enterprises with funds borrowed 
from a formal institution. The second is to scale up or graduate an informal or semi-formal 
formal financial arrangement, such as a credit union or NGO lending program, into a formal 
financial intermediary. More experimentation is needed, however, before conclusions can 
be reached about the circumstances under which these alternatives can be successful. 
10. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF TERM FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
FINANCE INSTITUTIONS. Most Sub-Saharan African countries lack long 
term domestic savings for term lending. Attempts to create Development Finance 
Institutions have not adequately resolved the problem. 
Term finance is especially difficult to obtain in most Sub-Saharan African countries 
for four reasons. First, interest rates are often fixed and are rarely adjusted for changes in 
inflation. For long term contracts, this results in the erosion of purchasing power for a 
lender's portfolio, even with full loan recovery. Second, institutions face difficulties in 
effectively monitoring installment payments over a long time period. Third, there is greater 
risk of large price fluctuations or other external shocks for a project financed for a long 
period, so there is a greater probability that a loan will encounter repayment problems. 
Finally, lenders face the risk of a mismatch in term structure when long term assets are 
financed by short term liabilities. These reasons cause lenders to resist making term loans, 
and many DFis created to resolve these problems have failed or are near collapse. Donor 
funding can temporarily resolve the domestic market failure by allowing DFis to match long 
term loans with long term liabilities. The basic problem is the lack of long term domestic 
savings; until that problem is resolved, donor funding of DFis is a poor substitute. 
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11. COOPERATIVES, SELF-HELP GROUPS AND OTHER SEMI-FORMAL 
SYSTEMS. In spite of the many failures of cooperatives and aedit unions, the 
fastest growth in financial services in many countries involves ROSCAs, savings 
clubs, village banks and other groups that operate on cooperative and self-help 
principles. The most successful group approaches are those that are built with 
strong member participation and control 
The experience of many group arrangements, such as cooperatives and credit unions, 
is checkered in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is ironic, therefore, that the most rapid growth in 
financial services in many countries has occurred in semi-formal entities, such as ROSCAs, 
savings clubs, village banks and other groups that operate on cooperative and self-help 
principles. Much remains to be learned abut the factors that contribute to the long term 
sustainability of cooperatives, credit unions and other group experiences, but some 
conclusions are emerging. First, governmental efforts to create cooperatives from the top 
down and use them as conduits for inputs and have usually fared poorly compared to those 
that begin with strong member participation and control. Second, credit unions do best 
when they emphasize savings mobilization and adopt conservative lending policies. Third, 
there appear to be limits to the size and composition of groups that can effectively work 
together at the local level. Fourth, small localized groups may never be a good source of 
long term finance, and there may be high covariance in member income which makes them 
vulnerable to crop failures and other economic shocks that simultaneously affect all 
members. 
12. SPECIAL PROGRAMS FORMICROENTERPRISESAND WOMEN. Special 
programs for lending to microenterprises and women are emerging in many 
countries because of their lack of access to formal jinancial institutions. These 
programs frequently involve NGOs and PVOs, and occasionally are part of large 
financial reform projects. 
Studies show that small enterprises face greater difficulties in accessing formal 
financial services than larger firms, and women in Africa play a larger role in owning and 
operating businesses than in other regions, so their access to credit and other financial 
services is important. Many NGOs and PVOs have developed programs to support 
m.icroenterprises but there is considerable skepticism about the capacity of many African 
institutions to implement large scale microenterprise projects. Furthermore, there are 
doubts that credit-only minimaHst projects can resolve the problems faced by many 
enterprises, and that the small group loan approach with frequent loan repayments can be 
applied to farm and agribusiness lending. Access to formal finance is problematic for 
women even though it is often argued that women borrowers have a better loan repayment 
performance than men. The reasons are not clear. In some cases, legal and land tenure 
issues involved with borrowing from formal institutions may make borrowing particularly 
difficult for women. In other cases, financial institutions may perceive that the enterprises 
in which women engage are too small and risky for formal loans. A clearer understanding 
is needed about those issues which fall within the financial domain, such as ways to 
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streamline and simplify loan procedures, versus those that are related to larger society-wide 
constraints, such as the ability of women to own and mortgage property. 
13. THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NGOS AND PVOS. NGOs and PVOs 
have rapidly expanded to fill the perceived need for credit, especially for 
microenterprises and women. Questions are being raised about their long term 
viability. 
With the decline in large donor-funded targeted credit programs, NGOs and PVOs 
have been created in large numbers to fill a perceived need for credit, especially for 
microenterprises and women. Several NGOs are implementing microenterprise projects 
oriented towards farm and nonfarm activities. There are also suggestions, however, that 
many of these programs are precarious, that they are poorly managed, that they are not 
business-like, and that they exist only because of large external grants and donations. 
Therefore, it is not clear that this wave of external assistance channeled through NGOs and 
PVOs will be any more successful in the long run in contributing to financial market 
development than previous donor sponsored approaches. 
14. LACK OF CONSENSUS AMONG DONORS. The lack of a common 
approach among donors to financial market and agribusiness development leads 
to fragmented financial markets, a lack of competition in the financial sector, 
and high reporting costs. Scarce local administrative talent must be used for 
donor coordination rather than building and operating strong finandal 
institutions. 
A large number of bilateral and multilateral donors, NGOs and PVOs support and 
operate projects designed to strengthen financial market and agnbusiness development in 
Sub-Saharan African countries. Although there seems to be a somewhat greater consensus 
today than previously about the appropriate role of finance in development, there is still a 
great divergence among the individual approaches. The lack of a common understanding 
and approach among donors creates problems. Each funds a specific model or activity and 
the result is an uncoordinated system that leads to fragmented financial markets, a lack of 
competition in the financial sector and high reporting costs for participating institutions. 
There is a great need for improved coordination in the donor community and a greater 
degree of consensus in the approach to be used for financial market and agnbusiness 
development in the region. 
RESEARCH AGENDA 
A research agenda is presented for AI.D. that responds to both the short and long 
term needs of financial markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. The first part aims to make a short 
term impact by working with and through informal and semi-formal finance. The second 
part emphasizes the research needs for strengthening formal finance. 
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A short term financial strategy that may improve the agricultural sector's response 
to economic reforms involves the expansion of wholesale-retail financial relations in which 
agribusinesses, linked to formal financial institutions, use their liquidity to make informal 
loans to retailers, farmers and microenterprises. The rationale for this strategy is that in 
countries where marketing is being privatized, the larger agn"businesses may have already 
established their creditworthiness with local or offshore financial institutions, or will be able 
to do so more quickly than smaller firms. Therefore, the financial sector can perform the 
relatively easier task of making wholesale loans to a small number of agribusinesses which, 
in turn, make retail loans to many smaller enterprises. 
The research to analyze this possible strategy includes two types of studies. The first 
type is a set of selective case studies of emerging agnbusinesses engaged in input and output 
marketing. The second focuses on the relationships between formal financial institutions 
and key agnbusinesses. The studies would be designed to determine how agnousinesses 
finance themselves now, and how they would respond to greater opportunities for retailing 
loans to their clients. 
The long term financial strategy in Africa requires an expansion of and improvement 
in formal finance. Research should seek to determine the reasons responsible for the wide 
range of problems and failures that have occurred, and to identify policy changes and/ or 
innovations that will improve performance. Ten key research areas are identified. 
1. Interest rate levels and related transaction costs. 
2. Mechanisms to reduce risks for savers and lenders. 
3. Strengthening prudential regulation and supervision with possible extension to semi-
formal financial systems. 
4. The dynamics of user owned financial institutions that influence their sustainability. 
5. Applicability of the minimalist credit-only approach to agriculture. 
6. Expansion of financial linkages. 
7. Mechanisms for contract enforcement and collateral substitution. 
8. Issues of gender and access to financial services. 
9. Techniques for deposit-led restructuring programs for financial institutions. 
10. Institutions and instruments for expanding term finance. 
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A REVIEW OF THE UTERATURE ON FINANCIAL MARKETS AND 
AGRIBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: 
LESSONS LEARNED AND SUGGESTIONS FOR AN ANALYfiCAL AGENDA 
A. BACKGROUND 
Agriculture is the dominant sector in Sub-Saharan African economies and is a 
potential catalyst for generating broad-based, sustainable economic growth. Improving the 
performance of the agricultural sector requires increasing productivity through the adoption 
of high-yielding technologies, improved management of natural resources, and more efficient 
marketing systems and agribusinesses. The efficient production, processing and marketing 
of agricultural commodities is often linked to access to efficient and reliable financial 
services. Households and businesses use a variety of savings and lending services provided 
through formal and informal financial arrangements. Informal sources, often available at 
the local level, are adequate for many types of financial needs. However, as farm and 
nonfarm businesses grow and become more sophisticated, they often need more 
sophisticated financial services of the kind offered by formal financial institutions. 
In recognition of the role of finance in the process of economic development, 
governments and donors have devoted a significant amount of resources in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, especially in the past couple of decades, to the task of providing loans and other 
financial services to agribusinesses. These efforts may have helped specific enterprises, but 
most countries today still do not have a strong, viable financial sector that can provide 
reliable financial services to farms and other agribusinesses. In fact, many firms and 
households still must rely on informal sources and arrangements for the safekeeping of their 
savings and for loans. This paper is aimed at improving our understanding of why this 
situation exists and identifies areas for additional research. It is based on an extensive 
literature review of financial markets and agribusiness development in the region, and by 
focused field work in four countries. 
The Africa Bureau of AI.D. has developed A Strate~ Framework for Promotitli 
A&ricu1tural Marketing and A&rlbusiness Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. As part of 
its effort to guide country missions in the design of successful agribusiness programs and 
projects, the Bureau entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with The Ohio 
State University through the Financial Resources Management (FIRM) cooperative 
agreement to conduct research on finance in Africa. The research activities are meant to 
build upon and extend current knowledge about the relationship between sound financial 
markets and services and the development of agricultural marketing activities and 
agribusiness ventures. The MOU identifies four tasks: 1) conduct a literature search on 
Sub-Saharan African financial markets; 2) prepare a brief draft report synthesizing the 
literature; 3) conduct brief research activities in four select countries; and 4) present a final 
report including the annotated bibliography and bibliographic essay. 
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This paper is the final report based on the literatul'e review and focused field work 
in Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Niger and The Gambia. It has two objectives. One is to 
synthesize the lessons learned The second is to identify priority research issues that need 
to be studied in order to design better projects and programs to improve the performance 
of agnousinesses in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although the results may be relevant to South 
Africa and Middle Eastern countries, the literatul'e searched was limited to Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The paper is organized to address the several issues specified in the MOU. These 
include a synthesis of the current approaches being used to develop financial markets and 
to identify what seems to have worked and what seems to have failed; to identify the lessons 
learned from these experiences; to suggest aspects of financial market development and 
financial services for agribusiness and agricultural marketing that require additional 
investigation; and to develop for the Africa Bureau an analytical agenda for future research 
on finance to be conducted in the region. 
Since a comprehensive annotated bibliography of over one thousand items generated 
the ideas included in this paper, the references included in this paper were limited to those 
items that are most comprehensive, are most accessible, and have been published most 
recently. Therefore, they capture most completely the lessons learned in Sub-Saharan Africa 
during the past couple of decades. The paper is organized into six sections. Section B 
provides a brief summary of the approach used to identify the literature reviewed. Section 
C defines the elements of the financial systems found in Sub-Saharan African countries. 
These systems could be arrayed along a continuum from most to least formal, but for 
purposes of discussion they are subdivided into three financial systems: forma.l, semi-formal. 
and informal. Section D reviews the major approaches used in these countries to develop 
financial markets. Section E summarizes several lessons learned from the different 
approaches, interventions, policies and programs used in the region to develop financial 
markets. The last section identifies several issues and a short term and long term research 
agenda for financial market development. 
B. APPROACH USED IN THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
A fundamental task for AlD. is to develop a strategy, policies and programs 
concerning financial markets as they relate to agriculture and rural development in general, 
and specifically for agricultural marketing and agribusiness development. Since the 
relationship between finance and economic enterprises is complex, for this bibliographic 
review it was necessary to adopt a broad view of the literature to be searched. This section 
briefly discusses the issues leading to the adoption of this broad approach which, of course, 
influences the nature of the analysis conducted and the conclusions presented. 
The general approach to the literature involved: 1) defining the financial sector to 
be studied; 2) searching the literature in the U.S. and abroad for information on the types 
of participants and clients of financial systems in Sub-Saharan Africa; 3) reviewing the 
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agribusiness literature with special care; and 4) developing preliminary ideas about the 
nature of the lessons learned and the gaps that exist in existing knowledge. 
• DEFINITION OF THE FINANCIAL SECfOR. The financial sector of Sub-
Saharan African countries is made up of several formal and informal arrangements 
and institutional forms. Both formal and informal arrangements may be important 
sources of financial services in any given country. Furthermore, understanding the 
factors that determine the success of informal finance may provide insights into ways 
to improve formal finance. For these two reasons, the literature search covered all 
types of financial arrangements and institutional form.s, whether spontaneous or 
specifically designed and assisted. The financial sector will be defined in the next 
section as consisting of formal. semi-formal, and informal systems. 
• PARTICIPANTS IN THE FINANCIAL SYS1EM. The participants or clients of any 
financial system include a wide variety of individuals, households, firms, businesses 
and organizations. Many studies do not specifically identify or describe the 
participants of the financial institution or arrangement being studied. It may be 
possible to learn, for example, that a credit union in Cameroon has many rural 
members, but there may be little information on the types of economic activity 
(enterprise or business) that may benefit from the financial services provided by the 
credit union. Therefore, the literature review included all materials that might have 
relevance, directly or indirectly, to rural and urban agribusinesses. 
• AGRIBUSINESS DEFINED. The term agribusiness has been defined in several 
ways. We chose to adopt a broad definition in which agribusinesses engage in a wide 
variety of agriculturally related activities. Some involve on-farm production activities 
we typically think of as farming. Others involve a complex set of activities 
undertaken on or off the farm. This includes the typical backward linkafies of input 
supply and distribution for rural and urban enterprises. They also include a variety 
of forward link~s that involve transporting, storing, transforming products produced 
on the farm and/ or related to agricultural products. Agribusinesses range from small 
backyard processing activities to large scale multilateral companies. Some employ 
the most traditional technology, while others are tied into international markets and 
employ modem international technology. Although relatively little of the relevant 
literature actually uses the term aiWbusiness, in fact much of the economic activity 
found in Sub-Saharan Africa is directly or indirectly related to awbusiness. (See A 
Strate~c Framework for Promotin~ Airicu1tural Marketin~ and Awbusiness 
DevelQPment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Office of Technical Resources, Bureau for 
Africa, Publication Series No. 90-1, USAID, 1991, for a more comprehensive 
discussion of this point) 
• ECONOMIC ACTIVITY OF HOUSEHOlDS AND FIRMS, AND THE FUNGI-
BILITY OF FINANCE. Many individuals, households and firms in Africa engage 
in multiple economic activities. Some farmers, for example, produce commodities, 
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but also engage in processing, transportation and marketing activities which are often 
associated with agribusinesses. likewise, a large urban firm may export both 
agricultural and mineral products. Because of this heterogeneity and the fungtoility 
of finance, it is impossible, therefore, to identify studies and reports that analyze 
policies, projects, and institutions that benefit just one type of economic activity. 
• SAVINGS AND CREDIT. African policymakers and donors share a concern for 
improving agnbusiness access to formal finance , so they typically concentrate their 
interventions, policies and programs on lending and on public sector institutions 
because they can more effectively influence them. Many households and firms, 
however, find that deposit and savings services are even more important to them than 
loans, and the long term sustainability of formal financial institutions is crucially 
dependent on their ability to mobilize savings. For this reason, the literature review 
included materials that discuss both the lending and saving mobilization aspects of 
financial intermediation. 
• SOURCES OF LITERATURE. The most relevant finance literature for this task 
is found in the U.S. Because many other bilateral donors and foreign researchers 
have been involved in finance, the literature search included not only the U.S., but 
also England, France, Germany, Italy and Portugal and donor archives such as the 
World Bank and FAO. Computer data bases were consulted, library collections were 
searched, and contacts were made with specific organizations that had access to 
relevant literature. The search included academic literature, consultant reports, 
NGO/PVO publications, and design and evaluation reports. Several publications 
identified in other annotated bibliographies were obtained and reviewed. A 
bibliography prepared by Mooney (1985) reviewed 220 AlD. agribusiness projects 
in Africa from 1970-1986. Several of these projects had credit components. The 
annotated bibliography by de Treville (1986) on contract farming in Africa also 
included some interesting publications dealing with finance. The WID bibliography 
by Townsend (1988) produced some relevant gender related material not found 
elsewhere. Since there have been many developments reported in the literature in 
the last decade that have changed earlier beliefs and recommendations, priority in 
coverage and analysis was given throughout the literature search to items produced 
in the 1980s and 1990s. 
• FIELD VISITS. After the first draft of this paper was completed, brief field visits 
were made to Burkina Paso, Cameroon, Niger and The Gambia. These visits were 
structured to test some of the initial lessons learned and the ideas developed for the 
future research agenda. These visits involved discussions with key AID, banking and 
government officials, representatives of NGOs and the private sector. A list of 
contacts made is included in the appendix. Since funding constraints prevented more 
extensive field visits, a second phase of the research activity will be undertaken to 
explore the hypotheses and lessons learned in more detail and in more countries. 
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C. DEFINITION OF THE FINANCIAL SECfOR 
An important first step in the analysis of the relationship between financial markets 
and agribusiness development is to identify the important elements of the financial sector 
that exist in a country. A wide variety of formal and informal arrangements, contracts and 
institutional forms are typically found in Sub-Saharan African countries. Together they 
provide financial services to both borrowers and savers. Governmental and donor policies 
influence how the financial sector evolves over time and how it functions to provide 
financial services. 
Examples of the major types of financial arrangements and institutions found in Sub-
Saharan Africa are presented in this section. These financial arrangements could be 
arranged along a continuum from most to least formal in terms of their organization and 
operation. But for purposes of analysis, it is useful to subdivide them into three groups or 
systems even if this involves some arbitrariness in grouping: formaL semi-formal and 
informal. In all three systems, some examples can be found that specialize largely or 
exclusively in lending, others in savings, and others that intermediate savers and borrowers. 
Table 1 lists the primary financial arrangements included in each. A brief explanation of 
the three systems follows. Only those examples which are most relevant for agribusiness 
purposes are listed. 
1. FORMAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
The formal financial system in most countries has three components. One compo-
nent includes the Ministries of Finance, the Central Banks, and the other national regulatory 
and prudential institutions that establish the rules of the game for most formal institutions 
and sometimes for parts of the semi-formal and informal financial systems. Normally, these 
entities do not make loans or accept deposits from clients other than the formal financial 
institutions, but in most countries they play a large role in determining the terms and condi-
tions under which other agents provide financial services. The Ministries of Finance directly 
affect financial institutions through their role in setting financial policies, influencing Central 
Banks, and through participation in donor financial project. Through their involvement in 
other policies, such as setting foreign exchange and tax rates, they influence the profitability 
and creditworthiness of businesses that are the clients of financial institutions. 
The second component consists of a group of financial institutions that provide 
financial services directly to savers and borrowers, and these are the focus of this review. 
Several types of financial institutions found in some countries, such as insurance companies, 
and social security, pension and investment funds, are not included because to date they 
have not been important sources of financial services for agribusiness development. 
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Table 1 
Important Components of the Financial Sector 
Regional and National 
Central Banks, Treasury, 
and Other Regulatory 
Bodies 
Agricultural Cooperatives 
Credit Unions 
Banques Populaires 
Financial Intermediaries: Integrated Dev. Projects 
Commercial Banks Village Banks 
Development Banks 
Savings Banks 
Postal Savings 
Cooperative Banks 
Unit Rural Banks 
Finance Corporations 
Capital Markets 
Self-Help Groups 
Savings Clubs 
Communal Qubs 
Mutual Aid Associations 
ROSCAs 
Moneylenders 
Moneykeepers/Mobile Bankers 
Input Suppliers 
Storeowners/Merchants 
Trader-lenders 
Farmer-lenders 
Friends 
Neighbors 
Relatives/Family 
a The formal financial system includes 1) Ministries of Fmance, Central Banks and national regulatory 
authorities; 2) formal financial institutions that provide financial services directly to savers and 
borrowers; and 3) capital markets including money, bond and stock markets. 
b The semi-formal financial system includes a variety of financial arrangements, often involving groups of 
persons as members in an organization. They usually fall outside the purview of the formal banking 
authorities, but are sometimes licensed and supervised by other governmental agencies. 
c The informal financial system includes a heterogeneous set of individual and group financial 
arrangements that generally fall outside the scope of government and donor assistance, but attempts are 
sometimes made to control and regulate them. Some are autonomous, while others represent a reaction 
to the repression of the formal system. 
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The third component represents the capital markets, including money, bond, and 
stock markets. Capital markets are in the early stages of development in Sub-Saharan 
African countries, such as Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Nigeria is one of the few 
countries in the region in which the stock market is becoming fairly important. Although 
capital markets will emerge and will provide services to large scale agnbusinesses, to date 
they have not been very important for agnbusiness finance. This lack of developed capital 
markets may pose a constraint to the privatization of parastatals that are important in the 
agribusiness sector. 
Formal financial intermediaries have been the focus of most government and donor 
intervention in Africa during the past two decades. These institutions have frequently been 
created, regulated, and financed with the objective of increasing their contnbution to econo-
mic development. Most of the time, this objective of "supply-leading finance" has been more 
important than the objective of creating sustainable, prudent financial entities. The formal 
financial institutions most important for agnbusiness development are briefly identified 
below and a discussion about their performance and problems is provided in the following 
sections. 
• COMMERCIAL BANKS. Commercial banks are the oldest form of banking in most 
countries. Historically, they were often foreign owned and engaged mostly in serving 
an urban clientele and providing financial services for commerce and trade. A 
variety of measures have been employed to encourage them to expand their rural 
operations, but they are often accused of channeling rural savings into urban loans. 
• SAVINGS BANKS. These institutions frequently have been organized and 
supported by European donors that recognized the need to stimulate the savings 
habit. In several countries, they have successfully mobilized rural and urban savings, 
but generally have not been an important source of loans except for housing. 
• POSTAL SAVINGS. Many countries have a long history of promoting savings 
through the postal system. Although they mobilize savings from many households, 
they tend to invest in bank deposits, government bonds, and other safe financial 
investments rather than engage in making many loans to households or businesses. 
• DEVELOPMENT BANKS. Governments and donors have been extremely active 
in creating, regulating and funding specialized development finance institutions 
(DFis ). DFis are usually created to meet specific financial needs that other types of 
banks do not and/ or can not provide. This often means that a state-owned 
Agricultural Development Bank or Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole (CNCA) is 
created specifically to provide short, medium and long term loans to agriculture. 
Examples of these institutions can be found in a wide variety of countries including 
Burkina Faso, Kenya, Mozambique, Niger, Senegal, and The Gambia. Most of the 
funds lent by these banks are provided by governments and donors so these DFis 
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generally do not mobilize much of their funds through deposits. This fact has made 
them heavily dependent on subsidies and wlnerable to failure. 
• COOPERATIVE BANKS. A few countries have created cooperative banks as apex 
:institutions serving agricultural cooperatives. Besides their regulatory functions for 
the cooperatives, they often try to capture government and other funds for on-lending 
by their member cooperatives that lend for production and marketing activities. 
These banks can be found in several countries, especially in East Africa, where there 
is a long tradition in cooperative development. 
• UNIT RURAL BANKS. Ghana is the only Sub-Saharan African country with unit 
rural banks. These banks are owned by a large number of persons in the local 
community, and are chartered to provide financial services in that community. They 
provide both savings and lending services. One of the differences between unit banks 
and the so-called "village banks .. being developed by NGOs is that they are formally 
regulated and supervised by banking authorities. 
• FINANCE CORPORATIONS. Finance corporations are frequent in Latin American 
(financieras}, but it is not clear if these nonbank financial institutions are important 
in Sub-Saharan Africa because they are not mentioned in most studies. Apparently 
they have met with some success in Kenya. Since African countries generally have 
less well developed financial systems than found in other regions, it is possible that 
finance corporations have not yet become important. 
2. SEMI-FORMAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
Semi-formal financial arrangements generally fall outside the purview of the formal 
banking authorities, but are sometimes licensed and supervised by other governmental 
agencies, such as a Cooperative Registrar, or are operated through a government office. 
They usually involve groups of persons in some type of membership organization and are 
often owned by the members. They may also have formal written statutes, constitutions, and 
by-laws. Some are created and supervised by NGOs and PVOs and receive government and 
donor funds to subsidize their operations and for use in on-lending to households and 
businesses. Many countries have used usury laws to set the maximum interest rates that the 
semi-formal financial system can charge on loans. Several examples of semi-formal financial 
arrangements that are important in the provision of financial services to agn.ousinesses are 
listed below. 
• AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES. Multi-purpose agricultural cooperatives 
often provide loans and other financial services in addition to input and marketing 
services. They have been particularly popular in the East African countries of Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda. Some European donors have been active in recent years in 
supporting the development of agricultural cooperatives. Unlike credit unions, 
cooperatives usually do not emphasize savings mobilization from their members. 
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They are sometimes linked to apex cooperative institutions or federations from which 
they receive loans to finance their own operations and for on-lending. Agricultural 
cooperatives fund a wide range of agnbusiness activities from on-farm production 
through off-farm processing, transport, storage and marketing. 
• CREDIT UNIONS. Credit unions are single-purpose cooperatives that specialize in 
financial services. They have been actively promoted in Cameroon, Ghana, Lesotho, 
and Togo, and recently in Niger. A distingujshing feature of many credit unions is 
their strong orientation towards share ownership and savings mobilization. Whereas 
agricultural cooperatives often attempt to limit their loans to so-called productive 
purposes, credit unions typically lend for any purpose for which their members desire 
to borrow because obtaining a loan is a strong motive for saving by members. 
Hence, they finance a variety of productive and consumption purposes for households 
and their businesses. Credit unions have been frequently organized and assisted by 
churches or other NGOs and PVOs and they usually have formal operating rules. 
Banques populaires in Rwanda are a new type of unit financial institution that 
operates much like a credit union (Mugesera, 1987). 
• INIEGRA1ED DEVEWPMENT PROJECTS AND PARASTATAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS. Many Sub-Saharan African countries have included credit in integrated 
development projects and parastatal organizations to improve agricultural 
performance. For example, the AlD. Senegal Agricultural Production Support 
(APC) project provides technical assistance, training, equipment and credit to support 
improved cereal production (Mock, 1990). In Niger, the Centrale d' Approvisionne-
ment receives credits from the CNCA and direct government subsidies to provide 
subsidized inputs to farmers through cooperatives (Graham, et al., 1987). An IF AD 
project in Mali channels its short and medium term credit operations through the 
Cotton Organization. Yet another example is the Sasagawa Global 2000 Projects in 
Ghana, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia that provide credit in kind to farmers to 
support technological improvements in cereal production (Yudelman, 1991}. Since 
these projects are implemented through government departments or special 
development agencies, the loans to farmers are sometimes made directly through a 
non-bank project office. In other cases, the loans are made through a cooperating 
financial institution or cooperative. Donor funds have supported many of these 
projects. The funds go to both on-farm and off-farm activities. 
• VILLAGE BANKS. Several community based village banks have been created in 
recent years. For example, the Swiss organization INTERCOOPERATION, (Organi-
sation Suisse pour le Developpement et la Cooperation), the French CIDR (Centre 
International de Developpement et de Recherche), and the German G1Z (Deutsche 
Gesellschaft fiir Technische Zusammenarbeit) are supporting the creation of village 
banks in Mali, Burkina Faso and The Gambia (IN1ERCOOPERATION, CIDR and 
Joint Working Group, 1989). These organizations are village organized and operated 
banks designed to mobilize savings and make loans in the village for production and 
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consumption. Unlike unit rural banks, they are not formally regulated and 
supervised by banking authorities. The U.S. Freedom from Hunger Foundation in 
its village-based credit-with-education food and nutrition programs in Ghana, Mali 
and Togo is stimulating village savings mobilization which is augmented by external 
funding sources (Aryeetey, 1992). The program in Ghana is linked to a unit rural 
bank. These programs are similar to the FINCA (Foundation for International 
Community Assistance) village banking model used in Latin America and Asia since 
the mid- 1980s (Holt, 1991). 
• SELF-HELP GROUPS. The concept of self-help groups is frequently attributed to 
German development programs and seems to be more widely used in Asia than in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Programs are being implemented to identify existing or create 
new village based groups and encourage them to mobilize their savings for the 
benefit of the village. An example is the IF AD Village Fund project in Mali A 
distinguishing feature is the effort to link them with formal financial institutions by 
depositing group savings with a local lender. This group fund is intended as a 
guarantee against future individual or group loans made by the lender. The 
guarantee fund may be augmented by NGO funds to increase the amount of loans 
that can be guaranteed. The loans are typically intended to support on-farm or small 
off-farm processing and marketing activities. 
• SAVINGS CLUBS. Savings clubs are like self-help groups except their primary 
objective, at least initially, is to simply encourage the savings habit among their 
members, without necessarily advocating that the savings are needed for village 
improvement or to establish the saver's future creditworthiness for a loan. In some 
cases, club members pool their labor and capital to engage in cooperative farming 
or other business ventures, such as with the kafos in The Gambia (Shipton, 1987). 
The well-known Zimbabwe Savings Clubs appear to be motivated in part by the 
opportunity for women to accumulate savings independent from, and sometimes 
without the knowledge of, other family members (Chimedza, 1989). Like the self-
help groups, some savings clubs have government, donor or NGO support in their 
formation and operation. 
3. INFORMAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
The informal financial system includes a heterogeneous set of individual and group 
financial arrangements. They generally fall outside the scope of government and donor 
assistance, but attempts are sometimes made to control and regulate them. Some are 
autonomous, such as communal clubs and mutual aid associations, and can be expected to 
thrive even when the formal system develops and expands. Some types of trade finance, 
however, may represent a reaction to the repression of the formal system, and may decline 
in importance as the formal system develops. Since the informal system seems to thrive in 
spite of the problems that plague the formal system, some experimentation is underway to 
use the informal system to channel funds from governments and donors to farmers and small 
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scale enterprises. Linkages naturally exist between the formal and informal systems when 
traders, processors, and exporters borrow from formal institutions and on-lend to farmers 
and marketing agents who produce and purchase commodities. Some examples of informal 
financial arrangements that are important to agnbusinesses are discussed below. 
• COMMUNAL CLUBS AND MU1UAL AID ASSOCIATIONS. Although there is 
little systemic information, there are indications that some rural villages in Sub-
Saharan Africa have developed local communal or mutual aid associations or funds 
to meet local needs. They seem to serve more of an insurance or community deve-
lopment role rather than being a source of finance for businesses. These organiza-
tions have a strong saving and self-help orientation. Some focus on mobilizing labor 
and funds for village projects. Others mobilize funds as part of their social activities. 
In some countries, the villages maintain strong links with former sons and daughters 
of the village who have migrated to urban and foreign jobs. These migrants often 
send money back to their home villages to help finance local projects. Although 
generally oriented towards projects that benefit the entire village, these organizations 
may make loans to village members in cases of emergency. Normally loans are not 
made to finance individual businesses. 
• ROTATING SAVINGS AND CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS (ROSCAs). ROSCAs are 
a very popular form of organization for mobilizing and allocating savings in Africa. 
They are known under a variety of names such as tontine, osusu, susu., idir, djanggi, 
and tontine (Cameroon, Senegal), osusu (The Gambia), asusu (Niger, Sierra Leone), 
ekub (Ethiopia), djanaggi (Cameroon), and chilemba (Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe) 
(Chandavarkar, 1989). In the typical ROSCA, a group of individuals assemble 
around an organizer, and each member makes a fixed contribution of money at 
regular intervals (daily, weekly, monthly). The savings "pot" is then allocated to one 
member through prior agreement, through lottery, or through auction. The process 
continues until each member receives a pot. The cycle may then be repeated, or the 
group may dissolve and be reconstructed later with different members. ROSCAs are 
a credit mechanism for those whose turn comes up early in the cycle; for those whose 
turn comes up late, it is a savings mechanism. The funds are often used for 
consumption or to finance a lumpy investment. But since the timing of receipt of the 
pot cannot be predicted, ROSCAs cannot be counted upon as a source of credit for 
a project involving a specific calendar, such as farming (Von Pischke, 1992). 
• MONEYLENDERS. Moneylenders are private individuals who specialize in making 
loans or make loans as a sideline business. They may augment their private source 
of capital with formal loans obtained for one of their business enterprises. They 
generally make short term loans, often used for consumption and emergency 
purposes, but also engage in lending for productive purposes. Moneylending is often 
viewed negatively in many countries, so many firms and households hesitate to admit 
in surveys that they borrow from moneylenders. They have been studied in the 
Malawi (Bolnick, 1990), Nigeria (Eboh, Ugama and Kereke, 1991) and Sudan 
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(Ahmed, 1975), but generally professional moneylenders appear to be less important 
in Sub-Saharan African than in many Asian countries. 
• MONEYKEEPERS/MOBILE BANKERS. Some financial arrangements exist that 
provide savings facilities through an individual agent. Village moneykeepers in 
Niger, for example, accept deposits from individuals and village clubs and associa-
tions for safekeeping. Sometimes these funds are used to purchase goods for the 
saver in the capital city or in other countries (Graham, et al., 1987). In Nigeria and 
Ghana, "susu collectors" visit market women daily to collect savings (Seibel, 1989). 
These savings agents usually pay no interest on the deposits collected, and may even 
charge a fee for the service provided, so factors other than the rate of return on 
savings motivate the savers. One motive is the possibility of a future loan because 
some agents are also moneylenders and use their own capital or the savings 
mobilized to make loans. Another motive is to physically remove the savings from 
the household and from the possible claims of other family members. Because of 
some cases of fraud, Ghana now requires that susu collectors be licensed with the 
Central Bank. Women's World Banking received the first license to collect savings 
from women market traders in Accra in a savings program which may eventually 
evolve into a lending operation as well. 
• PRIVATE INPUT SUPPLIERS, STOREOWNERS, TRADER-lENDERS, AND 
FARMER-LENDERS. Private marketing agents have always existed for some crops 
and are beginning to play a larger role in countries that have privatized their 
parastatal marketing boards. Furthermore, the traditional local retail shops found 
in towns and villages have always been an important source of credit for consumption 
goods and for the products they sell that are used as production inputs for local 
businesses. These firms and individuals provide credit as a means to expand their 
businesses. Input suppliers and storeowners are interested in selling their production 
and consumption goods, so to increase sales they agree to accept deferred payments 
from purchasers who lack liquidity to immediately pay cash. Therefore, they provide 
credit-in-kind and usually receive payments in cash. Repayment may be required in 
a few weeks for consumption goods, or at the end of the production season or cycle 
for production goods. Trader-lenders, millers and processors and other 
agribusinesses need farm products for their trading and processing activities. They 
provide loans, in cash or in kind, to operators of farms and other businesses in order 
to assure access to the products they produce (Miller, 1977). Usually, therefore, loan 
repayment is made in products at the end of the crop year or production cycle. 
Farmer-lenders may make loans to farm workers to insure that they get labor needed 
for crucial periods of farm work. Loan repayment then is made in labor services 
during the crop season. Farm and nonfarm businesses also make loans when they 
consign their products to middlemen and merchants for sale. 
• FRIENDS, NEIGHBORS, RElATIVES AND FAMILY. Informal loans are made 
by a variety of persons who are closely related to or are in close proximity, socially 
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and physically, to borrowers. These persons often provide loans for emergency 
purposes, but are also reported by entrepreneurs to be the most important source of 
funds for working capital and fixed assets used to start agribusinesses (Liedholm and 
Mead, 1987; liedholm and McPherson, 1991). In many cases, these loans carry no 
specific term, and are repaid only when the borrower has the capacity to do so. They 
also tend to be interest free but may involve reciprocity when the lender needs a loan 
or labor services. 
D. APPROACHES TO FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
The purpose of this section is to summarize the major approaches used by 
governments and donors to develop financial markets in Sub-Saharan Africa during the past 
couple of decades. This review is limited to those approaches for which the afDibusiness 
sector is one of the sectors exvected to benefit from the approach. The presentation focuses 
on the institutional forms that have been the target of the approach, or through which 
financial services are channelled to businesses and enterprises. 
Three general observations should be made about the literature reviewed before 
discussing the individual approaches. First. much of the literature is case study oriented 
with few cross-country studies or syntheses that attempt to systematically review the 
experiences of several countries. Therefore, it is necessary to view with caution the 
recommendations often found in studies which suggest that countries should introduce some 
specific reform or adopt some innovation because it appears to have worked in some small 
application in one country. Furthermore, the lack of systematic comparative analyses and 
thorough review of lessons learned is one of the reasons that similar problems emerge 
across countries and programs, and why policies and programs are introduced in a country 
when they have been shown to be flawed in other countries. 
Second. the literature clearly shows that most governments and donors have pursued 
a supply-leading approach to finance which has emphasized increasing the supply and 
reducing the cost of loans to specific sectors (i.e., agriculture, small farmers, etc.). 
Institutional strengthening has also been pursued but usually to support the supply-leading 
strategy rather than to build strong financial intermediaries. To reach their objectives, 
governments have established targeted credit lines for specific clientele groups, have set 
quotas for commercial bank loans to these groups, have limited and subsidized interest rates, 
have channelled funds through banks, cooperatives and credit unions that agree to lend to 
the desired clientele, and have created specialized agricultural development banks and other 
institutions to specialize in lending to these groups. 
The supply-leading approach has been shown to have several fundamental 
weaknesses. It ignored savings mobilization and created a dependency syndrome in which 
the lenders become dependent on cheap government and donor funds. It created rent 
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seeking opportunities in which nontargeted borrowers used political influence to gain access 
to the cheap funds. Financial institutions were undermined because they were often not 
allowed sufficient margins to cover their costs and risks. Finally, credit was treated as an 
input in production so it's value as a fung:t"ble resource was ignored. 
The reforms that have been undertaken in many Sub-Saharan African countries in 
the past few years have reduced or eliminated many of the problems associated with targets, 
quotas and interest rate restrictions. Many institutions are now placing more emphasis on 
savings mobilization, recovering loans and covering operational costs. However, it is 
disturbing to note that many of the recent NGO and microenterprise projects reported in 
the literature appear to be repeating some of these same mistakes today (Adams and Von 
Pischke, 1992). 
The lbird observation is that, until recently, most governments and donors have shied 
away from using the private sector to provide financial services to the agribusiness sector. 
At best, cooperatives are created and/ or are used to channel loans to farmers and 
agribusinesses. But few programs, for example, try to stimulate traders or trading networks 
to lend to priority clientele groups. This results in a heavy bias towards state involvement 
with its several problems of accountability and viability. This problem will be discussed in 
detail later. 
• COMMERCIAL BANKS. The objective in many countries has been to expand 
commercial bank services to rural areas because of the perception that households 
and businesses in rural Africa suffer from a credit constraint greater than their urban 
counterparts. Efforts have been made to reduce the urban bias of banking by 
expanding the banking network into rural areas, and by reducing the interest rate and 
increasing the amount of loans made to rural customers. Nigeria has been 
particularly active in this approach by setting targets or quotas for the commercial 
banks that specify a proportion of their loan portfolio that should be allocated to 
rural loans (Okorie, 1988). Banks that did not meet their quota were required to 
deposit the deficit interest free in the Central Bank for lending to the Nigeria 
Agriculture and Cooperative Bank. The Central Bank of Kenya followed a similar 
policy beginning in 1975 when it required the commercial banks to lend 17 percent 
of their deposit liability to agriculture (Masini, 1987). Donors have often channeled 
project funds through central banks for commercial bank on-lending to targeted 
customers. Many of these programs and policies have been developed on the 
expectation that commercial banks would overcome their traditional reluctance to 
lend to rural clients if their cost of funds would be reduced, and if they gained 
experience in rural lending through participation in an integrated project which 
removed or reduced some of the production and market problems normally 
confronted by their borrowers. The Nigerian experience reflects the difficulty of 
getting banks to make loans to borrowers and sectors they perceive to be risky and 
uncreditworthy (Central Bank of Nigeria, 1986). The experience of many countries 
that recently reformed their financial systems is that commercial banks have tended 
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to withdraw from agricultural lending. This has been the case in Ghana, The 
Gambia and Uganda. This trend is likely to continue as long as banks continue to 
hold a negative view about agriculture and agribusinesses, and as long as high 
interest, low risk alternative investments exist in government securities. 
• SAVINGS BANKS AND POSTAL SAVINGS SYSTEMS. Most African countries 
have a Post Office Savings Bank and/ or some other types of savings bank. They are 
often important for small savers. For example, Niger has a Caisse National 
D'Epargne (CNE) which mobilizes savings through the post office branch network 
It is the only formal financial institution to supply deposit services in rural areas. A 
survey of farm households revealed that although little formal savings was reported, 
the CNE was the single most important institution where deposits were kept 
(Graham, et al., 1987). The rural nonfarm population, however, represented a much 
larger share of CNE accounts and represent the greatest potential for rural savings. 
Surely many of these accounts represent local agribusinesses that use the CNE to 
hold their temporary surpluses. Another example is the Caisse Geneale d'Epargne 
in Zaire which specializes in the collection of savings from individuals through the 
widest network of branches of any bank in the country. Unti11978, these savings 
were used mainly to make medium to long term mortgage loans and invest in public 
debt instruments. After 1978, it began to make small, short term consumer loans and 
short term commercial credit to small and medium private traders. The institution 
was in jeopardy as of 1987, however, because of bad debts on mortgage loans and 
accumulated operating losses (Masini, 1987). 
Two problems have prevented savings institutions from playing a larger role 
in the financial development of African countries. The first is that many pay low 
interest rates on savings and offer poor service so they have not realized their 
potential to mobilize savings. The second is that their resources are often deposited 
with the Treasury or a local bank to minimize the risk of managing assets. 
Considering the limited capacity of these institutions, this is a prudent policy. But 
some might play a more dynamic role by lending, especially in rural areas where they 
are the only formal institution. One example of this possibility is the fact that the 
AID Mission in Madagascar is considering ways to energize the National Savings 
Bank (Caisse D'Epargne) and assist it to begin lending operations. 
• DEVELOPMENT FINANCE INSTITUTIONS. DFis have been set up to support 
agricultural development in many African countries. In West Africa, these often take 
the form of CNCAs. With the exception of the Burkina Faso CNCA, many DFis 
have performed poorly. Many DFis have been expected to perform both wholesale 
lending to governmental parastatals engaged in input supply and commodity 
marketing, and retail lending to farmers and cooperatives. Donors often use DFI 
branches as retail outlets for the credit components of their integrated development 
projects. The limited branch network of most DFis restricts their ability to mobilize 
deposits and make retail loans. Since they do not mobilize many savings and are 
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government agencies, most of the lending of DFis is targeted, either to specific 
parastatals and cooperatives in their wholesale function, or to specific types of 
borrowers for targeted end uses in their retail function. A large amount of the assets 
of many DFis represent nonperforming loans made to parastatal organizations. As 
a result of their poor performance and as part of the financial reforms ongoing in 
Africa, some DFis are being closed, others are being recapitalized, and donors have 
been encouraged to rethink the role of these institutions in development (McKeon, 
1990). Specific examples include the closing of the CNCA in Niger, and the closing 
of the Agricultural Development Bank and the privatization of the Gambian 
Commercial and Development Bank in The Gambia. 
• UNIT RURAL BANKS. Ghana is the only Sub-Saharan African country to develop 
a wide network of unit rural banks of the type found in the U.S. and the Philippines. 
They were designed to provide financial services to households and businesses in 
rural towns and villages (Addeah, 1989). Their stockholders are residents of the 
local area, so in theory they have an advantage over branches of commercial and 
development banks in knowing their local clientele and can, therefore, screen local 
loan applicants and investment projects better. They have been supported by 
government equity investments, and by special credit lines from the Central Bank. 
They also benefit from special training and assistance programs, and are used by the 
government and donors to finance cocoa production and other agribusinesses. 
Therefore, these banks participate in targeted programs, but have the fl.extbility of 
mobilizing savings, and determining their own lending activities within the general 
constraints set by Central Bank regulations. 
• COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS. Many African governments have actively supported 
the development of agricultural cooperatives, and some have stimulated the 
formation of national federations and apex cooperative financial institutions. For 
example, the Cooperative Bank of Kenya was set up in 1965 to serve at the central 
bank for the cooperative movement. It was designed to both mobilize savings and 
make loans. Then in 1969, the Agricultural Finance Corporation was set up as a 
specialized lending institution to lend to farmers, cooperatives, and private companies 
(Masini, 1987). Ukewise, the Agricultural Finance Corporation of Zimbabwe was 
created in 1981. Almost ten years later, it became active in small farmer lending 
through a World Bank project. Prior to that, small farmers were largely served by 
agricultural cooperatives linked together in the Central Association of Cooperative 
Unions (Masini, 1989). Some government and donor programs aim to directly 
support the cooperatives so they eventually become stronger sources of services, 
including finance, to their members. Other programs, such as the AlD. Agricultural 
Sector Loan I project in Kenya, have used a cooperative bank as an institution to 
extend loans to farmers. Many cooperatives have encountered problems of 
insolvency, and many have fallen victim to fraud and corruption, such as occurred in 
The Gambia ( Oark, 1987). Rarely have cooperatives been able to manage 
successfully the offering of savings and credit services. The Danish-funded 
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Cooperative Development Fund in Kenya seems to have had a somewhat better 
experience. The funds went through the Cooperative Bank of Kenya to the 
cooperative societies that on-lent to its members. It has experienced fairly good 
recovery because it can deduct loan payments through coffee and milk deliveries to 
cooperatives (Danida, 1989). 
• CREDIT UNIONS. Donors, NGOs and PVOs have actively supported the African 
Credit Union movement. A.I.D. has channeled much of its support for country 
projects through the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU) and the Credit 
Union National Alliance (CUNA). AI.D. funded credit union projects have been 
particularly active in Cameroo~ Lesotho and Malawi, and more recently in Niger. 
The Canadians and Germans have also been active supporters of the movement in 
several countries. As with cooperatives, sometimes the assistance has aimed to 
strengthen the movement directly through the provision of equity capital, technical 
assistance and training to credit unions and their national leagues and federations. 
In other cases, the credit unions were assisted indirectly with funds provided by 
governments or donors for on-lending to their members. The technical assistance 
and training programs were intended to help credit unions improve their perfor-
mance, recruit more members and savings, make better quality loans, and increase 
loan recovery. One of the objectives of this assistance has been to encourage credit 
unions to more aggressively make loans to productive business ventures rather than 
deposit their surplus funds in banks. But when the Cameroon credit unions began 
to move in this directio~ they ran into increased loan recovery problems (WOCCU, 
1985). It was concluded that one of the problems that seriously weakened the credit 
unions in Lesotho was their involvement in projects designed to expand productive 
lending when they were not adequately prepared to undertake it (WOCCU, 1992). 
Two important characteristics of the credit union movement distinguish it from 
many other approaches to financial sector development. First, savings are 
emphasized and are a necessary condition for participation in the credit union. 
Second, unless they get involved in government or donor lending schemes, credit 
unions normally do not target their own funds for specified lending purposes. In fact, 
credit unions often do not keep detailed records on purposes of individual loans. It 
is expected that they play an important role in financing on-farm and off-farm 
agribusinesses. Magill (1991) estimated that 3 to 4 percent of the loans made by 
credit unions in Malawi went to small enterprises primarily involved in trading or 
home-based businesses. In Togo, almost one-quarter of the credit union loans made 
in 1989 were for small-scale production and commercial activities. About 80 percent 
of loans went to vendors, traders and small shopkeepers. Data from a sample of 
loans revealed that they largely financed sales of foodstuffs (cereals, corn, fish) and 
textiles (clothing, cloth, woven materials). 
• SAVINGS CLUBS, SELF-HELP GROUPS AND VIlLAGE BANKS. French, 
German, Swedish and Swiss bilateral programs, many NGOs and PVOs and multi-
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lateral agencies have active projects to stimulate individuals to form groups for self-
help activities, and to pool their individual savings. The savings club approach in 
Zimbabwe emphasizes the savings habit as a way to accumulate money for future 
production and consumption uses. Women often find this to be an important motiva-
tion for participation. Saving to establish creditworthiness for a future loan seems 
to be a secondary consideration for most savings clubs. The funds mobilized are 
deposited in the nearest financial institution. For example, the IF AD Financial 
Village Fund project in Mali began working with village associations (tons) in 1985 
to promote socio-economic development of villages. A specific objective is to collect 
savings for deposit in a village account in the Banque Nationale de Developpement 
Agricole (BNDA). Loans have been made for oxen, farm equipment, and seasonal 
inputs of seed and fertilizer (Bedard, Volume 2, 1987). The village bank approach 
in Burkina Faso, Mali and The Gambia is designed to actually develop small scale 
village banks in which savings are mobilized, deposited and used within the village 
(Chao-Beroff, 1990). 
Although there is considerable interest in these participatory groups, particu-
larly within the NGO and PVO community, the large international donors are just 
beginning to use them for on-lending for development projects. The uses made from 
loans provided by these groups, therefore, cover a wide range of consumption and 
production purposes, at both the individual and group or village levels. A character-
istic that differentiates these groups from other types of financial arrangements is the 
relative homogeneity of the participants and the small size of the groups. To choose 
to participate, to accept the financial and social obligations of membership, and to 
accept group liability for loans requires that the members know each other. This 
knowledge can be most easily obtained by restricting group membership to one 
village, to persons in the same occupation, and to persons with the same social and 
ethnic background (Schrieder and Cuevas, 1992; Slover and Cuevas, 1991 ). 
• PRIVATE INPUT SUPPLIERS AND STOREOWNERS/MERCHANTS. Although 
suppliers of production inputs and consumer goods frequently provide informal 
credit, there are relatively few programs recorded in the African literature in which 
the government or donors specifically channeled funds to these sources in an effort 
to increase their ability to offer credit. One exception is the AlD. Senegal 
Agricultural Production Support project, approved in 1987 and evaluated in 1990 
(Mock, et al., 1990). It was designed to increase cereal production by improving seed 
production, input distribution, and crop storage, marketing, and processing. Credit 
was to be provided through the banking system to firms engaged in these activities, 
and the input suppliers were expected to on-lend to the cereal producers. At the 
time of the evaluation, the financial component had never really been tested. The 
commercial banks were not willing to lend to the small and medium enterprises 
targeted for the project because of their perceived risk. The banks were willing to 
lend to the largest input distribution firms, but most of them had already borrowed 
up to the limit acceptable to the banks. There is little information available on 
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which to judge whether or not increasing formal loans to these types of firms results 
in greater informal on-lending to farmers or agnbusinesses. Furthermore, many local 
government officials have a hostile and suspicious attitude towards private traders, 
sometimes because of ethnic differences, so it is difficult to get them accepted as 
legitimate participants in targeted programs. 
• LOAN GUARANTEE PROGRAMS. Nigeria is one African country that 
aggressively promoted the use of a loan guarantee program in an effort to reduce 
lender risk and, thereby, encourage greater lending. Some NGOs and PVOs use 
second tier guarantee programs to expand the loans available to self-help groups. 
The Women's World Banking in Ghana and The Gambia deposits funds as 
guarantees in banks that agree to expand lending for women. The literature 
generally has been skeptical about the extent to which guarantee programs in 
developing countries actually contribute additionally to loan programs (Levitsky and 
Prasad, 1987). The argument usually made is that if a lender thinks that a loan will 
be good, it will be made; if it is expected to be a marginal or bad loan, it will not be 
made even if there is a guarantee, since only part of the loan will be covered. 
There is little information available to comprehensively evaluate the impact 
of guarantees on volume of lending or the type of loans made. The Nigerian 
experience is indicative of some of the problems encountered with guarantees. The 
Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund in Nigeria was designed to support 
lending for establishing and managing plantations, cultivating a wide variety of crops, 
and poultry, livestock and fish farming. It became operational in 1978. The liability 
of the Fund ranged from 75 to 100 percent of the loans made. Although the volume 
of guaranteed loans has grown, the basic problems that banks face in lending to 
agriculture and agribusinesses, such as high administrative costs, uncompetitive rates 
of interest, and lack of rural infrastructure, were not resolved. Therefore, as early 
as 1984, it was predicted that the bad debt problem faced by banks would simply be 
transferred to the fund ( Ghatpande, 1984 ). An evaluation in 1986 concluded it had 
largely benefitted large farmers, had not significantly contributed to commercial bank 
lending to agriculture, but suffered a large default rate which impaired its ability to 
recycle the fund. The weaknesses were diagnosed as: 1) a belief by borrowers that 
they did not have to repay banks because the loans were guaranteed, 2) diversion of 
funds due to low interest rates, 3) high default rates, 4) low coverage of small 
farmers and cooperatives, and 5) cumbersome procedures and delays in repaying 
claims (Central Bank of Nigeria, 1986). 
Subsidized credit guarantee funds have been set up in several W AMU (West 
African Monetary Union) countries to guarantee loans made to assist small, medium 
and cottage industries. Generally, these funds have not benefitted many businesses, 
yet have experienced large losses and have required frequent replenishment of their 
funds (Balkenhol, 1990). 
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• AFRICAN REGIONALAGRICULTURALCREDIT ASSOCIATION (AFRACA). 
In addition to the different approaches to financial market development that have 
been attempted in individual countries, one regional approach should be mentioned 
AFRACA, headquartered in Nairobi, Kenya, is part of the FAO system of regional 
agricultural credit associations. They were started with FAO sponsorship and support 
in the mid 1970s, but have now largely outgrown FAO financial support and receive 
support from donors directly. Major agricultural credit institutions and Central 
Banks are members and pay annual dues. AFRACA's programs include periodic 
technical meetings to report on issues important to the member countries, specialized 
training programs, distribution of publications, and the funding of small scale 
research projects. AFRACA is currently experimenting with Microbanker, a software 
program developed by FAO for use on microcomputers to manage small deposit and 
loan accounts. The first installations in Asia were evaluated as being successful in 
reducing bank operating costs and releasing staff for other activities, such as 
improved loan collection programs. 
E. LESSONS LEARNED 
This section presents our analysis of the major lessons learned about the policies and 
programs used to stimulate the development of financial markets and agnbusinesses in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Our analysis is based on the literature review, the visits made to the four 
countries, and the previous professional experiences that OSU faculty have had in the past 
several years studying African financial markets. These have included major studies in 
Niger, Mozambique, The Gambia, and Zaire, and short term assignments in Cameroon, 
Ghana, Kenya, Guinea, and Togo. The topics covered in this section begin with general 
macroeconomic concerns and end with specific financial ones. Most of the lessons cut 
across the various institutional forms discussed in the previous sections, and the exceptions 
are specifically noted. Most apply to all countries, but because of differences in history, 
development strategy, and policy environment, some are more significant in some countries 
than in others. 
1. MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POUCIES 
Financial markets cannot thrive unless the general macroeconomic and financial 
policies of the country are reasonably conducive. In recent years, the 
environment has been very negative for financial market development in many 
countries. 
The general economic and political environment in which financial systems operate 
makes a significant impact on their performance. Unfortunately, several Sub-Saharan 
African countries have experienced serious political disruptions, wars and civil conflicts. 
Ethiopia, liberia, Mozambique and Somalia are a few of the countries with these problems. 
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Obviously, in these circumstances, the disruption of economic activities and uncertainties 
about the future affect decisions and abilities to save, invest and respect previous contracts. 
Where these conflicts are widespread, there is little opportunity to build strong financial 
markets, and donors can do little except provide emergency h11manitarian assistance. An 
important concern in the major strife-ridden countries is the length of time that may be 
required for the economy to recover and for economic institutions, including banks, 
cooperatives, and credit unions to be rebuilt. 
Many financial sector programs and projects designed to strengthen financial markets 
directly or indirectly have involved targeted assistance to specific institutions and/ or 
clientele groups. The general macroeconomic environment has been largely ignored. 
Increasingly, the Africa literature has noted the important role of the macroeconomic 
environment in influencing economic performance generally, and the financial sector 
specifically (World Ban.k, 1989; Callier, 1991). 
It is now well documented that the general development strategy and accompanying 
macroeconomic policies pursued in several countries are major disincentives for agricultural 
growth. A study by Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988) found that the impact of government 
policies on agriculture from 1975 to 1984 was large and negative for COte d'lvoire and 
Zambia, but positive for Ghana. In several countries, import substitution industrialization 
policies and the heavy taxation of agriculture through parastatal marketing boards have 
tipped the terms of trade away from agriculture. Interest rate and other subsidies have been 
rationalized as a way to partially compensate for this discrimination. The problem is that 
the disincentives affect all producers with marketable surpluses, while usually only a few 
benefit from the subsidies. In addition, there are particular market circumstances and price 
movements that affect specific countries. The termination of the coffee agreement and the 
resulting price decline affects the major coffee producers; low cost foreign commodities, 
such as those available from the Republic of South Africa, discourage production and 
marketing of specific crops in Lesotho and other neighboring states (Simmons and Herlehy, 
1990). 
The relative impact of exogenous shocks versus policy failures varies widely across 
countries. For example, the Sudan did not suffer any deterioration in international terms 
of trade from 1973-75 to 1981-83, but its policy framework became highly distorted. On the 
other hand, Malawi lost five percent of its gross domestic income to movements in terms 
of trade, but its policy distortions remained relatively low. The terms of trade loss in 
Zambia was 18 percent of GDP and policy distortions reached a high level (Gulhati, 1988). 
Financial institutions are affected in several ways when macroeconomic policies and 
market trends operate to the disadvantage of agnbusinesses. Erst low profit enterprises 
appear too risky for lenders to finance; therefore they make few agricultural loans so their 
per unit operating costs are high. Second. they have few incentives to improve their capacity 
to service agribusinesses effectively, if they continue to concentrate on lending to urban 
customers engaged primarily in import oriented commerce and trade. Third they are 
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discouraged from developing financial innovations that will reduce costs and improve 
services for agribusiness customers. Fourth, the volume of voluntary deposits is low. fifth, 
loan recovery levels are low. 
Unsound financial policies have also had a negative impact on the financial sector 
in many Sub-Saharan countries (Jaeger, 1991). Interest rate controls have prevented lenders 
from establishing margins sufficiently high to cover costs and risks of lending to a dispersed 
agribusiness clientele. For example, Simmons and Herlehy (1990) noted that the 
maintenance of negative interest rates in Malawi jeopardized the financial viability of the 
institutional credit system designed to serve rural clients. Low interest rates and the 
availability of donor funds are believed to discourage rural savings mobilization in many 
countries. Barriers to entry and exit and detailed regulation of banks prevent the creation 
of new banks and discourage the development of financial innovations. The mandatory 
quotas used in Nigeria and Kenya to force lenders to make low interest loans to agriculture 
and other priority sectors force interest rates up in the non-priority sectors as lenders are 
forced to cross subsidize their operations. This may slow growth in the nonagricultural 
sector with negative spillover effects on agriculture. 
The political economy of economic policymaking and political interference into 
financial decisions about whom to lend to and from whom to collect appear to be significant 
issues, although the literature on them is sketchy. What seems clear is that the pervasive 
efforts to control economic and financial activity in Africa creates excellent opportunities 
for rent seeking behavior so that some financial decisions are made on noneconomic and 
nonfinancial criteria. 
The current trend towards greater market liberalization, deregulation and privatiza-
tion in Africa is encouraging and should provide more propitious conditions for developing 
the financial system and the economy as a whole. Some frustration has been expressed over 
the slow economic response that has followed reforms in Ghana, Malawi and The Gambia. 
The lack of entrepreneurial skill, on the one hand, and the remaining economic and political 
uncertainty, on the other, have been identified as possible explanations. High interest rates 
are also identified as a problem. The difficulty of the heavily indebted nations is that 
foreign debt service coupled with fiscal imbalances lead to high interest rates for 
government securities. Therefore, it is financially rational for financial institutions in Ghana, 
The Gambia and Uganda, for example, to invest in high yielding public debt rather than 
make loans required for private sector expansion. This crowding out problem disappoints 
those who thought that the recent economic and financial reforms would result in a greater 
flow of funds to agribusinesses. Even though the reforms improved opportunities for private 
sector development, several problems still prevent the financial systems from being more 
responsive in supplying financial services to agribusinesses. 
The accumulation of foreign debt in many countries, coupled with macroeconomic 
and political uncertainty, and the uncertainty about the CF A franc zone, have dampened the 
development of linkages with international financial markets in two ways (Sirleaf and 
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Nyirjesy, 1991). Em, many international banks began to withdraw their branches from Sub-
Saharan Africa in 1985. The countries affected include Cameroon, Congo, ~te d'lvoire, 
Gabon, Kenya, ~"beria, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Sudan. These 
departures were only partially offset by the expansion of Ecobank, Meridien and Equator 
in the region. Secon<L bank lending in the region in recent years has been concentrated in 
a few countries, especially COte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger and 
Zimbabwe. Offshore financing for specific agribusinesses is not well documented, but it is 
expected to be concentrated among the largest, most creditworthy customers and used to 
facilitate the importation of raw materials and equipment (i.e., to expand export sales from 
developed countries) and the exportation of major African agricultural commodities. This 
type of lending is likely to be secured with offshore deposits or some form of irrevocable 
repayment. 
2. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCfiVITY, RISKS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE 
Problems of low agricultural productivity, high production risks, and poor or 
nonexistent infrastructure reduce the potential for agribusiness development and 
retard the development of financial markets to serve agribusinesses. 
This review did not probe deeply into the large literature that exists about the pro-
duction problems of agriculture. That would require an in-depth separate study, and there 
are great differences in interpretation about the African experience. Proponents of one 
school of thought argue that the problem is economic, that is, inadequate incentives for pro-
ducers. Another school of thought argues that the problem of agriculture is technology, that 
is, appropriate production technology has not yet been developed for African conditions. 
There are three important agricultural issues in many Sub-Saharan African countries, 
that are more acute than in many Latin American and Asian countries, and that have a 
negative impact on agricultural producers, the agribusinesses that supply their inputs and 
market their outputs, and the financial markets that provide them with financial services. 
The first is that productivity levels are low for many types of crops and livestock, so even 
if production costs are low, profit margins are thin. Producers, therefore, are bad credit 
risks because many are poor and have few reserves to cover debt obligations when profits 
and income are especially low. Second, a~cHmatic conditions are difficult especially in 
the Sahelian countries. Producers are subject to considerable production risks in spite of 
the multiple cropping and intercropping strategies they employ. Periodic crop failures wipe 
out their savings and make it difficult for them to accumulate capital Third, infrastructure 
is weak and this affects input and output markets. Some of these problems can be 
ameliorated with improved access to financial services, but for most finance is not the 
solution. Seed and fertilizer supplies are often irregular, pesticides and agricultural 
chemicals unavailable, marketing channels inefficient, and roads, bridges, ports and 
information systems underdeveloped and easily disrupted. 
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Farmers respond to incentives. When they expect to receive good commodity prices, 
they expand output by purchasing more inputs and adopting new technology. As their 
income and food security grow, they are more inclined to consider new methods to reduce 
environmental risks and preserve fragile natural resources. This leads to increased demand 
for good quality inputs, for transportation and marketing services, and for information about 
technology, prices and markets. Therefore, a dynamic financial and agribusiness sector is 
needed to stimulate on-farm production, but its development is dependent on farm demand 
to grow and become a dynamic contributor to development. 
Often, the analysis conducted to justify targeted credit projects has underestimated 
the negative consequences of agricultural productivity, risk and infrastructure problems on 
the demand for loans. Credit can give farmers some additional liquidity to stimulate 
production. But it cannot resolve these more fundamental problems, which in the long run 
determine the success of the agricultural sector and the financial system that serves it. The 
attempt to raise agricultural production in Lesotho, for example, through ~creased lending 
by credit unions did not succeed because credit was not the key constraint to improved 
production (Simmons and Herlehy, 1990). Farmers who participate in targeted credit 
programs may even be worse off when the programs fail due to these underlying problems, 
but they are saddled with bad debts that prevent them from getting future loans. A clear 
example of this bad debt problem recently occurred in Ghana when the loan recovery rate 
in the Sasagawa Global 2000 project plummeted as it rapidly expanded from hundreds to 
thousands of participants (Yudelman, et al., 1991). 
These structural problems of the agricultural sector are likely to take considerable 
time. and investment to resolve. In the short term, economic reforms in· structural 
adjustment programs that require reductions in budget deficits may require a cutback in 
government investments for agriculture. Therefore, another factor explaining the limited 
supply response of agriculture to the reforms is that the investments in irrigation, research 
and extension which may have contributed to past growth and productivity have been scaled 
down to reduce fiscal imbalances. 
The structural problems of African agriculture also translates into reduced demand 
for commercial credit by agricultural producers and agribusinesses. Farmers and 
agribusinesses that face weak profits and high risks cannot pay the high interest rates 
currently charged for commercial loans. Nor can they risk losing their current assets by 
pledging them for loans. This explains the fact that much of the demand for small, high 
interest informal loans is for trading and commercial activities. This negative situation will 
change as the positive efforts of reform are felt. Although there are demand constraints in 
international markets, especially for traditional export crops (Koester, et al., 1990), there are 
opportunities for expansion into new· market niches, such as horticultural exports (Islam, 
1990). The successful expansion of horticultural exports in Kenya and the emergence of 
these exports in The Gambia demonstrate this potential (McFarland, et al., 1989). As the 
demand for these products grow, so will the demand for credit and for inputs and marketing 
services provided by agnbusinesses. 
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3. LOAN TARGETING AND SUBSIDIES 
The subsidization and targeting of credit that has characterized many credit 
programs has failed to resolve the real problems faced by the target groups. But 
they have had a negative impact on the institutional viability of financial 
institutions and may have even reduced, rather than increase, financial services 
to smal~ low-income producers. 
Many credit programs have been designed to fund special groups believed to have 
poor access to financial services, such as cotton growers, cereal producers, or nonfarm 
enterprises. To stimulate the adoption of specific cropping patterns and production 
practices, credit packages are often narrowly specified to fund a particular crop or 
production package, or for use in acquiring inputs or draft animals and equipment. Loans 
that qualify carry low interest rates. There are at least five problems with this approach. 
First, because of the fungibility of finance, borrowers will shift loan funds to other purposes 
if they can earn a higher rate of return. Second. if the lender attempts to prevent the 
diversion of funds through close supervision, lender transaction costs are driven up, making 
it difficult to achieve long term self-sufficiency for the program. ThircL the margins 
authorized for many targeted programs are often too low to cover lender costs and inflation, 
so the lender is decapitalized even if all loans are recovered. Fou.rt11 if a project and/or 
institution is started with subsidies, it is difficult to transform it into a viable self-sustaining 
institution. Finally, the amount of funds for subsidies is always limited, so that a subsidized 
program always faces a limit to the number of participants it can accommodate, and there 
is no possibility of expanding it to all those enterprises that merit subsidies. There are also 
few incentives for the participants to graduate from a subsidized program into a commercial 
unsubsidized lender. 
Firms and households develop a complex pattern of production and financial 
arrangements to meet their needs. Often times they engage in several income earning 
enterprises simultaneously to utilize idle resources and distn'bute their income risks. 
Targeted programs, that encourage them to specialize in certain enterprises without 
providing strong support in the event of failure, expose them to increased risks. Lenders 
that offer loans for a variety of untargeted production and consumption activities are more 
likely to provide useful services and, therefore, will likely be valued by their customers. 
The result of these targeted, subsidized programs is contrary to what has been 
expected. The viability of financial institutions is undermined. Borrowers who receive 
subsidized loans are not necessarily better off if the loan simply represents a one-shot 
increase in liquidity rather than a regular access to finance. Because of the excess demand 
for funds that exists, lenders must engage in credit rationing which permits those with 
influence and political connections to crowd out the small, low-income firms and households 
for which the funds are targeted. 
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4. INTEREST RATES AND TRANSACTION COSTS 
When Central Banks and governments attempt to set interest rates at below-
market rates, the low interest rates charged for loans contribute to high 
transaction costs for borrowers and poor loan recovery, while reducing the 
viability of financial institutions. 
Only two studies were found that carefully calculated the transaction costs of financial 
intermediation. These two studies, in Niger and the Sudan, suggest that the cost pattern 
found in other regions also exists in Sub-Saharan Africa (Ahmed and Adams, 1991; Graham 
et al., 1987). Transaction costs are high for lenders in spite of so-called "cheap" government 
and donor funds, in part because of the heavy reporting costs associated with them. The 
costs tend to be higher than the spreads they are permitted to charge for loans. Since this 
often leads to excess demand for subsidized funds, the lenders have to employ non-price 
rationing when faced with interest rate controls. This means that borrowers face high 
borrowing costs because of the bureaucratic procedures involved, the number of trips and 
the expense required in travelling to the lender to monitor the application process, the 
occasional bn"be that must be paid, etc. Even if they are lucky enough to get a loan, the 
borrowers often maintain good relations with informal lending sources because the 
transaction costs are lower, even if the interest rates are higher, and they are usually a 
reliable source of consumption and emergency loans. Furthermore, borrowers are likely to 
repay the informal lenders first in order to maintain their credit reputation, but allow formal 
loans to fall into arrears if they conclude that the institution is transient and will not be able 
to provide a new loan after the current one is repaid. Formal financial institutions, 
therefore, find it difficult to achieve viability, because of narrow interest margins and poor 
loan recovery for targeted loans. 
5. REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
The regulatory and supervisory bodies for formal financial institutions have not 
developed sufficient capacity in many Sub-Saharan African countries to 
adequately ensure the prudential regulation of formal institutions, but they are 
now being called upon to expand their concerns into semi-formal financial 
systems. More attention is needed to designing institutions that encourage honest 
behavior and to monitoring and control procedures to support it. 
Policymakers have often attempted to build the financial system from the top down, 
and to use finance to stimulate economic growth. Many attempts have been made to 
mobilize domestic and international resources, and channel them through various 
institutional means to targeted enterprises and individuals. Rules and regulations have been 
established to direct lending to priority borrowers and sectors. Ministries of Finance and 
Central Banks have been preoccupied with monitoring how financial institutions have 
followed these regulations. As a result, they have ignored their traditional function, that is, 
prudential regulation with the aim of developing strong financial institutions. Investments 
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required to build strong regulatory and supervisory authorities have not been made. 
Therefore, most Central Banks are poorly staffed and trained, have little research capability~ 
and are not equipped to conduct regular, in-depth audits of the banking system. Rules 
either do not exist or are not enforced to prevent excessive lending to insiders or to one 
client. There is little attention to assuring that institutions properly and uniformly report 
on loan recovery, or make reasonable allowances for bad debt Training programs for the 
banking sector are weak or nonexistent (Ogunleye, 1991). 
At the semi-formal and informal level, problems can also be serious. Credit union 
and cooperative officials have embezzled money and have made excessive loans to 
managers, employees, and to elite members who have sufficient power to avoid repayment. 
These problems contributed to a weakening of the credit unions in Ghana and Lesotho. 
There are suggestions that problems of petty corruption and thievery are endemic in 
Africa and are bound to damage financial institutions. These problems are known but not 
widely documented. For example, it is clear that corruption was a major factor in the 
demise of many DFis, such as the Agricultural Development Bank in The Gambia. 
Although these problems may explain part of the phenomena, it is more likely that 
insufficient attention has been paid to designing institutions that encourage and reward 
honest behavior and to institutionalizing monitoring and control procedures to support it. 
This problem must be resolved if formal financial institutions are to function properly, and 
if savers are to have enough confidence to entrust their savings to them. It is particularly 
important now that liberalization measures are deregulating interest rates, targets, quotas, 
etc. The negative experience of the Southern Cone countries in South America following 
financial reforms shows the danger that exists for financial systems when prudential 
regulation is neglected. 
6. ACCESS TO FINANCIAL SERVICES, FINANCIAL DUAUSM AND 
FINANCIAL LINKAGES 
Financial dualism exists to a greater degree in Sub-Saharan Africa than in other 
regions, and a larger proportion of firms and households rely entirely on the 
infonnal financial system for all their financial services. 
Relatively few comprehensive financial surveys exist in Africa, so it is extremely 
difficult to quantify accurately the issue of access to formal financial systems, especially for 
agribusinesses in rural areas. The fragmentary data that exist suggest that no more than 
about 10 percent of rural households and enterprises receive formal loans in any one year. 
For example, a sample of rural households in Niger reported that about half received at 
least one formal loan over a five year period, but only four percent reported regular access 
to formal credit and few saved with formal institutions (Graham, et al., 1987). In Zaire, less 
than five percent of the households surveyed had ever received a formal loan in the fairly 
heavily banked Shaba region and it was estimated that in an average year only fifteen out 
of every thousand rural households obtained a formal loan. Formal loans were defined to 
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include credit unions and development projects so access to banks was even less. Only three 
percent of the households interviewed in the more remote Bandundu region reported ever 
receiving a loan and only two out of a thousand households obtain formal loans in an 
average year (Cuevas, et al., 1991). 
A greater percentage of large, urban based firms are expected to have access to 
formal finance, especially for export crops than do small, rural farms. An enterprise survey 
in Ghana revealed that over 80 percent of the medium and large scale enterprises had 
received a bank loan, but only 18 percent of the microenterprises (less than four workers) 
reported ever having received one (Steel and Webster, 1991). It is expected that in most 
countries, a somewhat larger percentage of households and enterprises, especially in urban 
areas, have a deposit or savings account with some type of bank, cooperative or credit union. 
At the same time, a much higher percentage report transactions with the informal sector. 
These data reflect the poor linkages that exist between financial markets, agribusinesses and 
small and medium enterprises, especially in rural areas. 
There appears to be a greater degree of financial dualism in Sub-Saharan Africa than 
in other geographic regions, with a larger percentage of the population that is completely 
outside the formal and even the semi-formal system, and relies solely on informal sources 
for its financial services. Financial linkages may also be less well developed. Savings 
accumulated in credit unions and self-help groups are often deposited in banking 
institutions, such as is the common practice in Cameroon and Senegal. In some cases, these 
groups also borrow from the same banks. But there is less evidence than exists in other 
regions of linkages in which borrowers in the formal system operate as lenders in the 
informal system. This is frequently the case in Asia for traders and merchants, and is 
viewed as an efficient way to provide loans to poor, small farmers and microenterprises. It 
is possible that these linkages are in fact less widespread in Africa because of the important 
role historically played by parastatal marketing systems. Conversely, it could simply reflect 
the fact that researchers have not systematically analyzed the issue. Traders in food 
commodities in The Gambia, for example, acknowledged that they obtain letters of credit 
from their offshore banks for importing basic commodities. In turn, they provided suppliers 
credit to their customers (Graham, et al., 1992). Private cereal traders in Senegal also 
reported receiving loans from a variety of sources and on-lending to their customers (Goetz, 
et al., 1987). 
The degree of financial linkages is important to understand for two reasons. First, 
where formal-informal financial linkages are numerous and important, it can be expected 
that macroeconomic polices, such as controls of the money supply in the formal sector, will 
also be transmitted to and influence the performance of informal finance. Second, where 
the linkages are well established, it may be possible to make formal loans to large 
creditworthy enterprises with the expectation that they will on-lend to smaller enterprises 
with most difficult access, including those agribusinesses in rural areas most distant from 
urban centers. This possibility will likely be constrained by the magnitude of marketable 
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surpluses produced by these smaller enterprises which in turn depends on resolution of the 
agricultural production problems discussed above. 
7. 1HE CRUCIAL ROLES OF SAVINGS MOBlllZATION AND LOAN 
RECOVERY 
Savings mobilization and effective loan recovery are two key factors that influence 
the long term viability of financial institutions. Both affect financial institutions 
and their clients in positive ways. 
Savings mobilization emerges from the literature review as a crucial factor in 
developing sound financial markets for two sets of reasons (Bedard, et al., 1987; Fischer, 
1989). First the number of persons with deposit and savings accounts in a financial 
institution is generally much larger than the number with loans. Therefore, many savers 
obtain great benefit from having secure places to hold their deposits and savings. While 
some bank clients perceive good investment opportunities in their businesses, and therefore 
borrow, others perceive that their best opportunity is to hold part of their investment 
portfolio in financial assets. Second, there are several ways that financial institutions benefit 
from mobilizing deposits. The total cost of mobilizing deposits for lending may actually be 
cheaper than for external funds. By mobilizing their funds, lenders can develop their own 
lending programs adapted to local needs rather than simply making targeted loans designed 
by the government or donors. Information obtained from servicing a client's deposit and 
savings accounts can be useful in evaluating creditworthiness for loans. 
Loan recovery emerges as the most important factor determining the long term 
viability of many financial institutions. Default rates of 20 to 30 percent that are common 
in many programs are too high to be covered by raising interest rates to all borrowers. 
Default eventually destroys or severely retards financial institutions such as occurred in 
many DFis, including the Agricultural Development Bank in The Gambia, the CNCA in 
Niger, and the credit union movement in Ghana. Unless governments or donors agree to 
recapitalize institutions with large defaults, they will eventually wither away. Many 
institutions have been lax in accounting for delinquent loans, in systematically collecting 
overdue loans, and in establishing realistic reserves for bad debts. One explanation is that 
management has not needed to be very concerned about these problems when using external 
funds. When lending out of mobilized funds, however, lenders must be more careful about 
the quality of loans made, they are forced to keep better loan records, and they have to be 
serious about loan recovery, otherwise they will not have the liquidity to meet demands for 
withdrawals. Borrowers may also take their loan repayment responsibilities more seriously 
when they know that the loan funds come from local savings rather than external sources. 
Savings mobilization, of course, raises some complex management issues that 
financial institutions have to anticipate. One is that better management skills are required 
for a balanced institution compared to a single purpose one, and accounting systems must 
be improved to handle a large number of deposit and savings accounts. The high covariance 
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of income in a small geographic region may imply that most households and businesses want 
to borrow at the same time, and most have surpluses at the same time, so there are 
difficulties in intermediating funds. Apex financial institutions, such as the Credit Union 
League in the Cameroon, that can transfer funds across regions may help this problem. 
Finally, there are risks to savers in countries that do not have deposit insurance. There are 
several reports in The Gambia, for example, about savers losing their savings when banks 
and credit cooperatives failed. 
8. COllATERAL, CONTRACf ENFORCEMENT, AND PROPERTY 
RIGIITS 
The absence of well-defined property rights and unreliable legal systems are often 
viewed as constraints to the functioning of formal credit markets. But since land 
may have little value due to local customs, improvements in land titling may have 
little impact on access to formal loans. The informal financial system, however, 
has found ways to deal with these problems. 
The traditional view is that lenders require collateral for loans so that in the absence 
of clear land titles, or other forms of collateral or collateral substitutes, there will be a 
contraction of credit on the supply side (Binswanger and Mcintire, 1987). Therefore, the 
absence of well-defined property rights, and unreliable legal systems are often cited as 
constraints for the functioning of formal credit markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
rationale for this argument relies upon two factors: (i), the requirement that collateral be 
"appropriable", i.e., that ownership of the item pledged as collateral is potentially 
transferable from borrower to lender in case of default, and (ii), the widespread dominance 
of customary (traditional) property rights, as opposed to legal (contractual) rights in land 
markets and other asset markets. The implications are that untitled land is invalid as 
collateral in credit transactions, and extensive titling programs are needed to improve access 
to credit, especially for the rural population. 
Indeed, there is some evidence that security of title increases access to the financial 
markets. Even officially granted occupation certificates in Nigeria have been treated by 
major financial institutions as necessary collateral for various types of loans (Feder and 
Noronha, 1987). This fact does not necessarily justify, however, great emphasis on 
improving land property rights and the legal system. Two other properties of acceptable 
collateral complement the appropriability feature. .Erst, items pledged as collateral must 
have value, which implies that a valuation method exists. Second, the eventual transfer of 
ownership or control over the asset pledged as collateral must be enforceable, which implies 
that a socially accepted mechanism of contract enforcement exists. 
Collateral valuation requires the existence of markets or some other suitable method 
of determining the use value of the asset. The value of land as collateral, even under 
perfectly defined legal ownership, relies upon the use value of the resource, and is a 
function of its relative scarcity. When land markets exist, land prices will reflect the use 
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value of the resource. But in many regions, land markets don't exist and in many regions 
of Sub-Saharan Africa, water use rights convey significantly more value than land use rights. 
Moreover. other assets likely to be pledged as loan guarantees, such as livestock, consumer 
durables. or use rights on plantations, are likely to meet the appropriability, value, and 
enforceability conditions for acceptable collateral, without the shortcomings associated with 
land use rights. 
Contract enforcement mechanisms do not necessarily require a legal. Western-style, 
system of rules and regulations. Indeed, a legal system may not even be a sufficient 
condition for the existence of an effective contract enforcement mechanism, if law 
enforcement, such as foreclosure on collateral. is not a credible threat to the potential 
defaulter. In some areas, social custom or political imperative may make it impossible for 
banks to foreclose on land that secures a defaulted loan (Atwood, 1990). In some areas of 
Kenya, land has little collateral value because land transfers to outsiders through sale or 
foreclosure are not always accepted as legitimate (Migot-Adholla, et al., 1991). 
In the absence of effective enforcement through the legal system, informal loan 
contracts use explicit or implicit enforceability clauses, such as the continuance of business 
relationships in linked transactions, third-party guarantees, or the witnessing of contracts by 
local authorities. The same authority, administrative or customary, that recognizes an 
individual's use right of a resource serves as a guarantor of the enforceability clause 
involving that resource. Some formal lending programs are succeeding in replicating or 
adopting the contract enforcement mechanisms prevalent in informal transactions. Ukewise, 
financial transactions with internal or built-in enforcement mechanisms, including supplier 
credit and other linked transactions, have attained a viability and stability that formal 
financial transactions rarely achieve. More attention is needed to identify how traditional 
contract enforcement mechanisms can be applied to formal finance rather than wait for 
expensive land titling programs to resolve the land-as-collateral issue. 
9. TilE IMPUCATIONS OF INFORMAL FINANCE 
Informal financial systems are pervasive in Sub-Saharan Africa, but there is no 
clear view about what this implies for formal jinancial systems or what 
policymakers should do, if anything, about informal finance. 
Informal financial arrangements and transactions are pervasive in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. They have managed to survive in many situations where formal finance has failed. 
It is clear that the informal and semi-formal financial systems must have some advantages 
over the formal system. There is no clear understanding about what to do with or about 
informal finance. The options include: 1) ignore it, 2) regulate it, 3) convert informal into 
formal finance, 4) borrow informal finance techniques and apply them to formal finance. 
and 5) strengthen linkages between informal and formal finance (Adams and Ghate, 1992). 
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Most Sub-Saharan Africa countries have tried to reduce the role of informal finance 
by actively encouraging the semi-formal and formal financial systems. In some cases, they 
have tried to regulate informal finance, such as when they try to impose interest rate 
restrictions. The Central Bank of Ghana, for example, recently required that susu savings 
collectors have to be licensed. In other cases, they have ignored informal finance, perhaps 
because they have recognized the futility of trying to regulate it. Two specific options have 
been largely untested until recent years. The first is to desi~ specific informal-formal 
linka~s, such as depositing self-help group funds as a loan guarantee with banks or 
developing wholesale-retail credit operations with traders, processors and other large 
enterprises that agree to make informal loans to small enterprises with funds borrowed from 
a formal institution. The second is to scale up or ~aduate an informal or semi-formal 
formal financial arrangement, such as a credit union or NGO lending program, into a formal 
financial intermediary. This occurred recently when a tontine in Cameroon was converted 
into a bank. These options require much more study and experimentation, however, before 
conclusions can be reached about the circumstances under which they can be successful. 
10. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF TERM FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
FINANCE INSTITIJTIONS 
Most Sub-Saharan African countries lack long term domestic savings for term 
lending. Attempts to create Development Finance Institutions have not 
adequately resolved the problem. 
Term finance is especially difficult to obtain in most Sub-Saharan African countries 
for four reasons. .E.iJ& interest rates are often fixed and are rarely adjusted for changes in 
inflation. For long term contracts, this results in the erosion of purchasing power for a 
lender's portfolio. Therefore, even with full loan recovery, the real value of the portfolio 
declines. Seconc:L institutions face difficulties in effectively monitoring installment payments 
over a long time period. Account management is notoriously the weakest feature of bank 
administration in developing countries, especially in Africa where management skills and 
practices are less developed. Third, there is greater risk of large price fluctuations or other 
external shocks for a project financed for a long period, so there is a greater probability that 
a loan will encounter repayment problems. Finally, lenders face the risk of a mismatch in 
term structure when long term assets are financed by short term liabilities. This causes 
commercial banks, that make loans out of deposits, to resist making term loans. 
The lack of term finance has prompted many governments and donors to create and 
fund DF1s. But many have failed or are near collapse for several reasons (McKean, 1990) . 
.Ei.ut, as noted earlier, large transfers of donor funds into DF1s have created attractive 
opportunities for rent-seeking by powerful groups in the society. Thus, political intrusion 
has influenced the allocation of loans toward the rich and powerful and created serious loan 
recovery problems as borrowers perceived their loans as government entitlements for 
services rendered in other political arenas. This has exacerbated inequalities in the 
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distribution of wealth and income. This point is documented most clearly in The Gambia 
(Graham, et al., 1992). 
Second. as noted above, the absence of well-defined property rights and 
underdeveloped judicial and legal systems have compounded and reinforced the entitlement 
psychology. Courts frequently make judgements favorable to borrowers or delay proceedings 
indefinitely on cases associated with large loans. Enforcement of collateral is rare and 
costly, thereby compromising this important guarantee for term finance. DFis and 
commercial banks have not been very successful in finding alternative solutions to traditional 
collateral. On the other hand, some informal and semi-formal financial systems have been 
able to effectively use collateral substitutes, such as group lending, group guarantee funds 
and linked contracts, to resolve this problem. 
Third, the administrators and managers of DFis are usually civil servants so 
incentives for good performance are largely absent in these institutions. There is little to 
no accountability; hence there are few internal sanctions for creating or administering a 
poorly performing loan portfolio. The normal poor delegation of authority means decisions 
are delayed and reviews are carried out at several administrative levels so that all 
responsibility is socialized and no one is accountable for poor institutional performance. 
Fourth, the reliance on donor resources creates large overhead costs in the form of 
repeated screening, documentation and reporting about loans made. Ironically, the 
additional personnel and time required to service targeted, subsidized loan schemes usually 
does nothing to strengthen the loan portfolio or improve recovery. The margin of 3 to 4 
percent which donors typically allow for DFis to administer their programs falls short of the 
8 to 10 percent costs they typically must spend to administer the donor's target portfolio. 
On the other hand, DFis commonly have poor accounting systems with inadequate and 
misleading documentation of loan delinquencies and arrears, especially for term loans. 
Eifth, DFis tend to have few branches thereby limiting access to the rural population 
and raising costs to those who try to obtain loans. This fact limits their ability to reduce 
dependency on external funds by offering deposit and savings services. By not offering 
savings services, they miss an important source of information about their customers that 
can be used when making lending decisions. 
In summary, the African experience of institutions largely offering term finance has 
been mostly negative. The short and medium term domestic deposits they have managed 
to mobilize do not match the longer term loans made. Inflexible interest rates erode the 
bank's capital base in the face of inflation and high administrative costs. Most important 
is the entitlement psychology that invariably accompanies the recourse to donor funds. 
Donor funding can temporarily resolve the domestic market failure by allowing the DFI to 
match long term loans with long term liabilities, but it also creates the potential for political 
intrusion and rent-seeking. The basic problem is the lack of long term domestic savings; 
until that problem is resolved, donor funding of DFis is a poor substitute. 
34 
11. COOPERATIVES, SELF-HELP GROUPS AND OTIIER SEMI-FORMAL 
SYSTEMS 
In spite of the many failures of cooperatives and credit unions, the fastest growth 
in finanda1 services in many countries involves ROSCA.s, savings clubs, village 
banks and other groups that operate on cooperative and self-help principles. The 
most successful group approaches are those that are built with strong member 
participation and controL 
A wide range of financial arrangements exist that share the characteristic of being 
owned and operated by their users. These range from large cooperatives to small self-help 
groups. The experience of these group arrangements in Africa is checkered. 
Multi-purpose agricultural cooperatives have generally been a failure because they 
are often used as agents for government control rather than for promoting group interests. 
In West Africa particularly, governments have used cooperatives as a means to link 
parastatal marketing agencies to farmers for purposes of supplying inputs and purchasing 
farm products. Cooperatives on-lend in kind or in cash, and rarely offer deposit or savings 
services. These cooperatives are not business oriented, are under-capitalized, are controlled 
by the government, are mistrusted by farmers and many have built up large bad debts. A 
somewhat more positive cooperative experience occurred in East Africa where cooperatives 
began with more of a grassroots approach. The early successes in Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda have run into difficulties in recent years, however, and they have been propped up 
with donor funds. For example, the Cooperative Savings Scheme for small coffee farmers 
in Kenya was reasonably successful. Total savings mobilized often surpassed small and 
medium loans outstanding. Loans were made out of funds mobilized and recovery was high. 
A Danida-funded project with the Cooperative Bank of Kenya provided support to less well 
developed cooperatives for training and on-lending. The rate of disbursement was less than 
projected but loan recovery was good, with an arrears rate of less than five percent after 
almost four years of operations (Danida, 1989). Other cooperative programs in the country 
have not fared as well, however. World Bank and AI.D. programs that used cooperatives 
for on-lending have been criticized for contributing to high farmer and cooperative loan 
arrears by making access to credit too easy. 
Credit union performance varies widely. They are performing fairly well in the 
Cameroon, Malawi and Togo, less well in Lesotho and poorly in Ghana. One of the factors 
that explains the relative success of credit unions compared to other types of cooperatives 
is their strong commitment to savings mobilization. To borrow, a member must first save. 
Unless they participate in special projects, credit unions usually lend only the funds they 
mobilize. This forces the leadership and the membership to take the lending process 
seriously. Therefore, they tend to follow conservative lending procedures. But this practice 
has also resulted in pressure to engage in more aggressive lending for productive purposes. 
The experience of Cameroon and Lesotho is that when they expand lending, they 
encountered higher delinquency rates (WOCCU, 1985; WOCCU, 1992). 
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Credit unions provide valued savings services for members and make loans important 
for enterprise development and household consumption, but they also have limitations. 
Some have not been aggressive enough about savings mobilization and have not been 
competitive because their interest rate structure has not kept pace with inflation. They are 
generally more successful in low inflation countries than in high inflation ones because they 
find it difficult to adjust their interest rates quickly. Given a loan to savings multiple of 2 
or 3 to 1, they have been dominated by borrowers who cannot get sufficient loans to meet 
demand. Management skills have been weak, and they have had losses due to poor loans 
and embezzlement. Some have difficulty in serving the poorest groups in society and 
women. 
Given the negative image that cooperatives have in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, it 
is ironic that the most rapid growth in the development of financial services in many coun-
tries has come from semi-formal entities, such as ROSCAs, savings clubs, village banks and 
other groups that operate on cooperative and self-help principles. Many of these groups are 
spontaneous and autonomous. Tontines in the Cameroon, for example, are pervasive and 
some are reported to involve thousands of dollars in urban areas. A new bank recently 
licensed in the Cameroon is reported to be based on a long-standing tontine. The strength 
of such traditional group activities is often due to the fact that they are created out of self-
interest by the participants who are committed to their success, and who carefully screen the 
membership and monitor performance to assure success (Henry, 1991). Because of these 
positive features, many organizations now promote the formation of groups, and govern-
ments and donors are using them to channel outside funds into rural and urban agnbu-
sinesses. The challenge suggested by the credit union experience is how to keep these 
groups saver-dominated, so that saver interests are protected when outside resources be-
come so large that they represent most of the loanable funds. Borrower dominated interests 
can take over in these circumstances, leading to low interest rates and poor loan recovery. 
Much remains to be learned abut the factors that contribute to the long term 
sustainability of cooperatives, credit unions and other group experiences, but some 
conclusions have emerged. first, governmental efforts to create cooperatives from the top 
down and use them as conduits for inputs and to act as government agencies have usually 
fared poorly compared to those that begin with strong member participation and control. 
Second, credit unions do best when they emphasize savings mobilization and adopt 
conservative lending policies. Third there appear to be important limits to the size and 
composition of groups that can effectively work together at the local level. They must 
achieve a high degree of sophistication if they are to successfully operate federations and 
apex institutions that intermediate funds across regions and heterogeneous memberships, 
and handle a large amount of resources as in the Cameroon. Fourth. small localized groups 
may never be a good source of long term finance, and there may be high covariance in 
member income which makes them vulnerable to crop failures and other economic shocks 
that simultaneously affect all members. 
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12. SPECIAL PROGRAMS FOR MICROENTERPRISES AND WOMEN 
Special programs for lending to microenterprises and women are emerging in 
many countries because of their lack of access to formal financial institutions. 
These programs frequently involve NGOs and PVOs, and occasionally are part 
of large financial reform projects. 
Interest in the special problems of financial services for microenterprises and for 
women has expanded rapidly in Sub-Saharan Africa as it has in other regions in recent 
years. Studies show that small enterprises face greater difficulties in accessing formal 
financial services than larger firms. Furthermore, enterprise studies frequently reveal that 
women in Africa play a larger role in owning and operating businesses than in other regions 
(Pong and Perrett, 1991). As many as 25 percent of rural households are female-headed 
with women having sole responsibility for managing production and financial decisions. 
Women provide much of the labor for operating farms and other agribusinesses (Due and 
Gladwin, 1991). For these reasons, the issue of women's access to credit and other financial 
services is even more important in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest of the world. 
The growth of microenterprises has been attributed to their advantages in the 
efficient use of capital and labor (Liedholm and Mead, 1987), but they have also been a 
source of employment for employees released in recent economic reforms. They are 
particularly important for women because of low barriers to entty (Carr, 1990). Therefore, 
many NGOs and PVOs have developed programs to support microenterprises. Some large 
donor funded projects, such as the World Bank financial reform projects in Ghana and The 
Gambia, have included special training and lending activities for women. The minimalist 
approach is frequently advocated because of the fairly successful examples found in other 
regions of which the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh is most well known. There is 
considerable skepticism, however, about the capacity of many African institutions to 
implement large scale microenterprise projects. Furthermore, there are doubts that credit-
only minimalist projects can resolve the problems faced by many enterprises, and that the 
small group loan approach with frequent loan repayments can be applied to farm and 
agribusiness lending with its greater seasonality in production and cash flow. 
Gender issues have figured more prominently in credit studies in recent years in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Studies have shown that many ROSCAs, self-help groups, savings clubs, and 
other semi-formal and formal financial arrangements are organized by women and have 
mostly or only female members and participants. Since market vendors are often women, 
market based groups are often exclusively composed of women. These informal financial 
arrangements have evolved because of the special needs and opportunities of women. 
Formal finance, however, is more problematic for women than informal finance even though 
it is often argued that women borrowers have a better loan repayment performance than 
men. The reasons for difficult access are not clear. In some cases, legal and land tenure 
issues involved with borrowing from formal institutions may make borrowing particularly 
difficult for women. In other cases, financial institutions may perceive that the enterprises 
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in which women engage are too small and risky for formal loans. Yet in other cases, women 
may not even try to get formal loans because they anticipate they will be denied. 
Greater attention is needed on gender issues in financial markets. A clearer 
understanding is needed about those issues that need attention which fall within the 
financial do~ such as ways to streamline and simplify loan procedures that affect 
women, versus those that are related to larger society-wide constraints, such as the ability 
of women to own and mortgage property. 
13. TilE EMERGING IMPORTANCE OF NGOS AND PVOS 
NGOs and PVOs have rapidly expanded to fill the perceived need for credit, 
especially for microenterprises and women. Questions are being raised about 
their long term viability. 
With the decline in large donor-funded targeted credit programs, NGOs and PVOs 
have been created in large numbers, some with international affiliates, to fill a perceived 
need for credit, especially for microenterprises and women. In the small country of The 
Gambia, there are over 100 registered NGOs, of which about a dozen provide financial 
services to poor households and enterprises (Graham, et al., 1992). An equally large 
number were found to be operating in Ghana. In Niger, these semi-formal organizations 
are practically the only source of rural financial services today other than those offered by 
the informal financial system. Several NGOs are implementing microenterprise projects 
oriented towards farm and nonfarm activities. Claims are made that these projects reach 
a large number of clients on a sustainable basis, in contrast to the largely negative 
experience of DFis and multipurpose cooperatives. There are also suggestions, however, 
that many of these programs are precarious, that they are poorly managed, that they are not 
business-like, and that they exist only because of large external grants and donations. They 
may assist a few select participants, but they are not capable of growing very large. 
Therefore, it is not clear that this wave of external assistance channeled through NGOs and 
PVOs will be any more successful in the long run in contributing to financial market 
development than previous donor sponsored approaches (Adams and Von Pischke, 1992). 
14. lACK OF CONSENSUS AMONG DONORS 
The lack of a common approach among donors to financial market and 
agribusiness development leads to fragmented jinancial markets, a lack of 
competition in the financial sector, and high reporting costs. Scarce local 
administrative talent must be used for donor coordination rather than building 
and operating strong financial institutions. 
A large number of bilateral and multilateral donors, NGOs and PVOs support and 
operate projects designed to strengthen financial market and agribusiness development in 
Sub-Saharan African countries. Some of these projects have broad scope, while others 
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involve only a few villages or enterprises. Although there seems to be a somewhat greater 
consensus today about the appropriate role of finance in economic growth and development, 
there is still a great divergence among the individual approaches. AlD. was among the 
leaders to recognize the limits of subsidized farm credit projects and was followed by the 
World Bank in working to correct the distortions created by specific targets and subsidies. 
But other donors, such as IF AD and some private organizations, still target specific groups 
for projects that provide credit at interest rates that fail to cover costs. Some of the major 
problems identified with small farmer credit projects are now reappearing in microenterprise 
projects. 
The lack of a common understanding and approach among donors creates problems 
(Morss, 1984 ). It complicates coordination and dialogue with governments about policy 
reforms. One donor trying to strengthen savings mobilization is frustrated when another 
channels subsidized funds into the same institution. Each donor and organization has a 
specific model or funds a particular activity and requires a special monitoring and reporting 
procedure. The result is an uncoordinated system that leads to fra.gffiented financial 
markets, a lack of competition in the financial sector as each project operates in isolation 
employing its own model, and high reporting costs for participating institutions. It also 
creates confusion in the minds of local decision makers about the appropriate strategy for 
growth and development. The problem has become so serious in The Gambia that the 
Central Bank is being forced to provide some guidelines for NGO /PVO financial operations 
(Graham, et al., 1992). But the Central Bank has hardly enough capacity to regulate and 
supervise the formal banking system and this additional task forces it to use scarce 
administrative talent to focus on donor relations rather than building and operating strong 
financial institutions. There is a great need for improved coordination in the donor 
community and a greater degree of consensus in the approach to be used for financial 
market and agribusiness development in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
F. RESEARCH AGENDA 
The Sub-Saharan African governments and the donor agencies are faced with a 
difficult challenge. On the one hand, they need to implement reforms and make 
investments for long term economic growth and development. On the other hand, they need 
to respond in the short term to slow economic and agricultural growth in many countries. 
This section presents a research agenda for AI.D. that responds to both the short and long 
term needs of financial markets. The first part presents research suggestions aimed at 
making a short term impact, while the second part identifies research issues associated with 
long term financial development. In the short term, reliance is placed on working with and 
through informal and semi-formal finance. In the long term, the objective is to strengthen 
formal finance. 
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1. SHORT TERM 
Many African countries have made progress in implementing reforms needed for long 
term growth and development. Markets and institutions are being hberalized, deregulated 
and privatized. New private agnbusinesses are expected to emerge and replace parastatal 
enterprises for input distribution and output marketing. Many of these agnbusinesses may 
need financial services if they are to grow and become competitive. Input dealers may need 
working capital loans to finance their inventory and accounts receivable as they supply their 
retailers, who will make credit sales to farmers. Private traders, retailers and processors 
may have to make cash and kind loans to farmers to stimulate production of the commodi-
ties needed for their agribusinesses. 
While the recent economic reforms have stimulated loan demand from farmers and 
agribusinesses, the old targeted loan programs are being dismantled in many countries. 
Financial institutions are discontinuing the fairly simple task of implementing targeted 
programs and funding large firms and parastatals. They now need to begin developing their 
own loan programs and making many smaller loans to clients with whom they have had little 
previous experience. They cannot be expected to immediately make this transformatio~ but 
their failure to respond quickly may jeopardize the economic reform programs. 
A short term financial strategy that may be worthy of consideration in this situation 
is one which involves the expansion of wholesale-retail financial relations in which 
agribusinesses, linked to formal financial institutions, use their liquidity to make informal 
loans to retailers, farmers, and microenterprises. This strategy would essentially involve 
mimicking the historical pattern of finance that existed in which import and export firms 
provided goods on credit or provided loans to producers and assemblers in advance of 
production. Brief sketches of how these trade and financial arrangements worked 
historically can be found in the books by Bauer (1954), Hopkins (1973) and Meillassoux 
(1971). Furthermore, these kinds of financial arrangements exist today for some 
commodities in some countries. For example, importers of rice and flour in The Gambia 
can often get 60-90 day credit from their European and Asian suppliers so they, in tum, 
provide short term credit to their wholesale and retail customers. likewise, private peanut 
traders used to provide short term loans to producers to ensure their supplies before 
parastatal agencies took over peanut marketing. 
The rationale for considering this strategy in countries where marketing is being 
privatized is that the larger agribusinesses may have already established their 
creditworthiness with local or offshore financial institutions, or will be able to do so more 
quickly than smaller firms with no financial track record or written accounts on which formal 
lenders can base credit decisions. Therefore, in the short term the financial sector can 
perform the relatively easier task of making large wholesale loans to a small number of 
agribusinesses which, through their retailers and agents, perform the more difficult task of 
making retail loans to hundreds and thousands of smaller enterprises. These agnbusinesses, 
in the short term, should have a comparative advantage relative to formal financial 
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institutions in accumulating information necessary for screening customers for loans. This 
will occur naturally as the agribusinesses interact with their customers through selling them 
inputs and purchasing their products. Furthermore, the agribusinesses may be able to 
achieve good loan collection performance through linked contracts in which borrowers have 
incentives to repay loans in order to gain access to inputs and markets. 
The research agenda to analyze this possible strategy includes two types of studies. 
The first type is a set of selective case studies of emer~& a~Ut:OOSinesses en&a&ed in input 
and output marketin..:. These studies should involve rapid subsector analyses of particular 
commodities or commodity groups to identify the principal agents involved, to determine 
how commodities flow backward and forward through the subsector, and to assess how 
equity and borrowed funds provide the liquidity to finance these flows. The specific issues 
to be investigated include: 1) types of financial services obtained from formal, semi-formal 
and informal financial systems, 2) terms and conditions of existing financial contracts, 3) 
types of backward and forward linkages that these agribusinesses have, and 4) special 
innovations, if any, that are facilitating access to finance. These studies should also 
determine the reaction of large agribusinesses to the possibility of making more cash 
advances and loans to their customers. 
The second set of studies should focus on relationships between formal finance and 
key agnbusinesses. These studies should evaluate the primary constraints that impede the 
flow of funds into commodity subsectors. The constraints might be venture capital for start-
up costs, or additional working capital for enterprises that already have a minimum amount 
of fixed assets and working capital. Specific measures, such as expanded loan guarantees, 
equity funds, and bonded warehouses, should be evaluated for their possible contnbution 
to expanding the funds supplied to agribusinesses. 
2. LONGTERM 
The long term financial strategy in Africa requires an expansion of and improvement 
in formal finance. Only formal finance can be expected to provide the volume of funds on 
the terms required for long term economic growth and development. The supply-leading 
approach to financial market development that has characterized much of the last two 
decades cannot stimulate economic growth, as argued by its proponents. In fact, the growth 
of the financial sector will depend significantly on the growth and performance of the 
economy, rather than vice versa. Some of the important agricultural productivity, risk and 
infrastructure problems mentioned above must be resolved if rural financial markets are to 
perform well. 
The literature reviewed reveals that there is no such thing as a unique institutional 
form that will succeed in providing financial services to African agnbusinesses. All the 
forms tried to date have strengths and weaknesses. The research agenda for financial 
markets should attempt to determine the reasons responsible for the wide range of problems 
and failures that have been encountered, and to identify policy changes and/ or innovations 
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that will improve performance. listed below are ten general research topics that, if 
undertaken, will provide answers to some strategic questions. 
a. INTEREST RATES AND TRANSACTION COSTS. Issues about interest 
rates have been the subject of great debate, but relatively little systematic analysis has been 
conducted on the subject in Sub-Saharan Africa. The savings literature is inconclusive about 
the role of interest rates in stimulating financial savings relative to other factors such as easy 
access and security of the savings. This could imply that savers in fact view the return on 
savings as less important than expected, or that interest rates on savings have never been 
increased enough to generate a significant response. The important issue clearly 
demonstrated is that low income savers have a substantially greater potential for financial 
savings than normally recognized. 
Most of the concern about interest rates on loans has focused on the need for low 
interest rates to stimulate borrowing which is expected to increase production, productivity 
and investments. Research has shown, however, that borrowers are more concerned about 
timely access than cheap interest rates. The significant issue concerns the impact of interest 
rates on lenders. Careful analysis is needed on the level of interest rates required for full-
cost recovery for loans including empirical estimation of lender transaction costs and losses. 
It is likely that such estimation will reveal that most lenders must charge much higher 
interest rates than at present to cover their costs, especially for small rural loans, but that 
the high rates charged by some microenterprise programs may reflect a significant amount 
of inefficiency. This observation implies the need to track transaction costs over time to 
determine if financial institutions are improving efficiency. This will focus attention on the 
need for innovations to reduce transaction costs so the returns to savers can be raised and 
the costs to borrower can be lowered. 
b. RISK REDUCING MECHANISMS. Savers and lenders share a general lack 
of confidence in the future of the economies of many African countries. Savers doubt that 
financial savings can provide the same level of return and security that are obtained from 
investments in real assets. Lenders doubt that many borrowers will repay their loans. More 
research is required on risk reducing mechanisms that improve confidence, such as deposit 
insurance, group lending, and loan guarantees, to determine how they can be used more 
effectively in Africa to reduce risks, and increase both savings and loans. 
c. PRUDENTIALREGUIATION AND SUPERVISION. Another issue closely 
related to confidence in the financial system is that of prudential regulation and supervision. 
Regulatory authorities in Africa have not been successful in preventing formal financial 
institutions from engaging in unsound practices. The regulatory burden will get even more 
difficult as countries attempt to bring some informal and semi-formal financial arrangements 
within some type of regulatory framework. Research now underway in other regions needs 
to be extended to Africa to determine the appropriate ways to strengthen regulatory 
processes for those financial arrangements that grow beyond the scope of self-regulation, yet 
are too small and numerous to be treated as formal financial institutions. 
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d. DYNAMICS OF USER OWNED INSTITIJTIONS. Small self-help groups 
appear to be functioning fairly well in Africa while cooperatives and credit unions have a 
checkered experience. There is little comprehensive analysis to explain this apparent 
paradox. It may be a matter of scale, or institutional design, or nature and magnitude of 
government involvement. Alternatively, the problems that will be faced by self-help groups 
may have not yet emerged. These are important questions because of the large number of 
self-help groups, village banks and other groups being sponsored by NGOs and PVOs. 
Some countries may be tempted to massively expand these operations without clearly 
understanding their strengths and weaknesses. On the other hand, these groups may use 
techniques that could be successfully employed by cooperatives and credit unions. Another 
concern is that many self-help groups appear to be vulnerable because their activities are 
concentrated in small geographic areas with a limited range of economic activities. Some 
mechanisms are needed to diversify their portfolios. A great deal of experimentation is 
taking place and many different models and approaches are being used. A systematic 
comparative analysis is needed in order to clarify what is working, what is not, and what 
innovations can be introduced to strengthen them. 
e. THE MINIMAI.1ST APPROACH APPLIED TO AGRICULTURE. The 
credit-only approach being used in minimalist programs appears to have been fairly effective 
in providing financial services to microenterprises in other regions. The limitations of this 
approach, however, are not well understood. Einl, the successful applications are found in 
regions more densely populated than most of Africa. This factor may limit the productivity 
of bank officers and increase operating costs in Africa. Second. most experience has been 
gained from programs that lend mostly to nonfarm or noncrop enterprises. Many African 
enterprises are linked to agriculture, which may require more lumpy investments and may 
produce more variations in cash flow than the microenterprises financed elsewhere. More 
research is needed on the applicability of the minimalist model to African conditions. 
f. FINANCIAL LINKAGES. Informal and semi-formal financial systems will 
continue to provide a major amount of the financial services received by many households 
and enterprises in the foreseeable future. Although they have displayed great versatility in 
the face of difficult economic environments, they have limitations such as small scale and 
concentrated portfolios that expose them to risks. Increased linkages between formal, semi-
formal and informal finance could help each utilize its comparative advantages and reduce 
the weaknesses of the other. In this way, the users of the financial services would gain from 
the advantages of each. Existing linkages need to be studied to see how they can be 
expanded and utilized more broadly. 
Another question concerns financial linkages of African countries with international 
financial markets and especially new innovations to stimulate these linkages. This area of 
study is important because these linkages may represent a crucial source of foreign capital 
investment for emerging agribusinesses, especially in the short term while local capital 
markets are developing. Some linkages already exist between African producers and 
exporters and European importers and banks. There may be ways to strengthen and expand 
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these linkages. A second important aspect of these linkages is that they may help local 
financial institutions to understand and develop the standards required in international 
finance. 
g. CONTRACf ENFORCEMENT AND COllATERAL SUBSTITIITION. 
Most formal financial systems in Sub-Saharan Africa have relied upon the traditional 
approach of using physical capital as collateral to secure loans. The absence of clear 
property rights and an active land market have created problems for banks in attempting 
to use land as collateral in the way it has been done for years in other countries. At the 
same time, it has been difficult for the formal systems to use the collateral substitutes that 
seem to work well for semi-formal and informal finance. Improved property rights and legal 
methods of contract enforcement will eventually reduce these impediments. But in the 
meantime, there is a need to learn if there are ways for formal finance to adopt some of the 
traditional contract enforcement mechanisms. 
h. GENDER AND ACCESS TO FINANCIAL SERVICES. The crucial role 
that women play in Sub-Saharan households and businesses, especially in trading and in 
rural areas, requires that the issues concerning their access to financial services must be 
better understood in order for appropriate policies to be implemented. Detailed studies are 
required to sort out which of the potential issues are really important. In some cases, the 
problem may simply be one of training more female agricultural extension workers to work 
with women. In some cases, the problem may require legal changes regarding the rights of 
women to own and mortgage land. Other cases may require expanding some of the new 
innovations, such as forming and linking women's self-help groups with the banking system. 
Finally, some cases may require fundamental changes in the attitudes and opportunities that 
cause women to engage in economic activities which are too small and risky to qualify for 
commercial lending. The crucial question that must be asked everywhere is whether or not 
the problems can be addressed within the financial system itself or whether they require 
substantive changes that go beyond finance. 
i. DEPOSIT-LED RES1RUCI'URING PROGRAMS. The most common way 
being used to restructure and rehabilitate failing banking institutions in most Sub-Saharan 
Africa countries is through increased government or private equity capital. However, a 
deposit-led approach is being used by AI.D. in the Dominican Republic and Honduras to 
rehabilitate credit unions, and to strengthen the Agricultural Development Bank in the 
Dominican Republic. The two rural credit programs of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia and 
Badan Kredit Kecamatan in Indonesia have emerged as independent viable entities based 
on strong deposit performance and adequate pricing of services. More attempts need to be 
made in Africa to strengthen financial institutions through deposit mobilization, and to 
accompany these efforts with action research to guide the programs and report the results. 
j. EXPANDING TERM FINANCE. Term lending is not likely to emerge very 
soon in most African countries. But as the benefits of economic reform are realized and 
as countries begin to achieve greater economic and political stability, the conditions for term 
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finance will improve. Investors will begin to consider long-gestation projects, savers will 
being to view long term savings contracts more positively, and lenders will become more 
optimistic about long term lending. Research is needed to design appropriate institutions 
and instruments that will be conducive to long term savings and loan contracts once these 
changes occur. 
Africa is desperately short of human capital in most fields, and this is also true in the 
finance field. Instability and low salaries make it difficult for most countries to retain 
trained staff in universities and research institutions. Most central banks and financial 
institutions have not made a strong effort to train and retain quality staff and to develop the 
capacity to conduct the research needed to build strong financial markets. More attention 
is needed to strengthen local research capacity, and to create and support regional research 
networks, such as AFRACA and the African Economic Research Consortium. These 
networks can be used to nurture domestic programs through training and the implementa-
tion of regional research projects. 
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